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ARTICLES 
The Misuse of Tobin’s q 
Robert Bartlett and Frank Partnoy* 
In recent years, scholars have addressed the most important topics in 
corporate law based on a flawed assumption: that the ratio of the market value 
of a corporation’s securities to their book value is a valid measure of the value 
of the corporation. The topics have included staggered boards, incorporation in 
Delaware, shareholder activism, dual-class share structures, share ownership, 
board diversity, and other significant aspects of corporate governance.  
We trace the history of this flawed assumption, and document how it 
emerged from Tobin’s q, a concept from an unrelated area in macroeconomics. 
We show that scholars have misused Tobin’s q, and we demonstrate empirically 
why scholarly assumptions about this ratio are flawed, particularly because 
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book value is error prone, which generates problems involving aggregated 
assets, omitted variables, and statistical bias.  
Our message for corporate law scholars is straightforward: view with 
suspicion the large body of empirical law and finance scholarship that misuses 
Tobin’s q. We also offer a cautionary tale for researchers more broadly: the 
current replication crisis in the social sciences is potentially even more serious 
than has been imagined, and there are critical questions about not only 
replicability, but also about validity.  
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You keep using that word. I do not think it means what 
you think it means. 
—Inigo Montoya, The Princess Bride1 
INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, scholars have assessed many of the key 
concepts in corporate law by studying empirically how they impact the 
value of corporations. For example, one central question in corporate 
law is whether widespread incorporation in Delaware is normatively 
desirable. Scholars have attempted to answer this question by studying 
the association between a firm’s state of incorporation and the value of 
the firm’s corporate securities, and their answers have significantly 
influenced policy.2 
Or consider the heated debate about the use of staggered boards 
of directors at corporations. Both shareholder-friendly and 
management-friendly groups have relied on empirical studies in their 
advocacy either against or on behalf of companies with staggered 
boards.3 These studies examine the association between the presence of 
a staggered board and the value of corporate securities. The articles 
published in this area have also been widely cited and influential. 
The same basic story holds for many of the most important areas 
of corporate law. How should we compare different countries’ corporate 
law regimes?4 How should we assess corporate governance indices, 
 
1.  THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987).  
 2. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) 
(finding that Delaware firms are worth more than firms incorporated elsewhere); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that 
firms incorporated in Delaware are worth two to three percent more than non-Delaware firms 
during the period 1991–1996, but not after 1996); see also Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, 
The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2015) (describing prior studies and employing a 
merger reincorporation event study approach). 
 3. See Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered 
Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018) (finding that a staggered board has no significant 
effect on firm value); Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 409 (2005) (finding that staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value); Alma 
Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from 
a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (same); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. 
Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. 
ECON. 422 (2017) (finding that the relationship between staggered boards and firm value is 
heterogeneous); Emiliano M. Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm Value: 
Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value? (NYU Law & Econ. Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-39, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2994559 [https://perma.cc/5HCD-LFTP] (same). 
 4. See, e.g., Larry Fauver, Mingyi Hung, Xi Li & Alvaro Taboada, Board Reforms and Firm 
Value: Worldwide Evidence, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 120 (2017) (measuring the valuation of firms to test 
the effect of different countries’ legal regimes); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei 
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which attempt to measure the quality of corporate governance at firms, 
including various provisions in their charters and bylaws such as 
takeover defenses?5 How should we assess the concentration of 
ownership among board members or shareholders?6 Scholars have 
attempted to answer all of these and many other important questions 
in corporate law using empirical studies that assess the relationship 
between changes in these factors and the value of a corporation’s 
securities.7 This kind of empirical research in corporate law has 
influenced scholars and policymakers in fundamental ways. 
These studies, including the most influential ones, use the 
econometric technique of linear regression. The basic idea is to test 
whether the data show a statistically significant relationship between 
some concept in corporate law (the independent variable) and the value 
of a firm’s securities (the dependent variable). Of course, linear 
regression is a powerful statistical technique when properly used. 
Unfortunately, many of these studies do not properly use the 
technique. Instead of simply testing the association between a corporate 
law concept and the value of a firm’s securities, they perform a 
potentially dangerous mathematical operation in the context of linear 
regression: division. Specifically, they divide the key dependent 
variable of interest—typically the market value of a corporation’s 
securities—by the accounting construct known as the “book value” of a 
firm’s assets. Book value is a record of a company’s assets and liabilities 
based on accounting rules that vary in whether an asset or liability gets 
recorded at historical cost, fair market value, or some other standard. 
For some of the most important assets owned by a firm, accountants 
record no book value at all. As we demonstrate below, dividing by book 
value of assets can be fraught with peril. 
 
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) 
(same). 
 5. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (finding that increases in a six-factor entrenchment 
index are negatively associated with firm value); Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003) (finding that an improvement 
in a corporate-governance index is associated with an increase in firm value). 
 6. See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership 
and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595 (1990) (finding that firm value is positively related to 
the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors and curvilinearly related to insider 
ownership at various levels); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988) 
(describing Tobin’s q as a “proxy for market valuation of the firm’s assets” and finding that q varies 
based on board equity ownership). 
 7. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248 (1994) (finding that firm value and diversification are 
negatively related throughout the 1980s). 
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Scholars have failed to account for this fundamental error, in 
part because the dependent variable commonly used in the literature 
has been given a sophisticated-sounding name: “Tobin’s q.”8 This 
variable, which has morphed over the years from a nuanced classical 
macroeconomic concept into the simple ratio of the market value of a 
firm’s securities divided by the firm’s book value of assets, has become 
pervasive in corporate law scholarship, even though it is a very poor 
measure of the value of corporations, the thing that scholars are 
purporting to study. 
The story of how Tobin’s q came to be one of the most important 
concepts in corporate law scholarship is untold in the literature. Yet 
this variable now plays a key role in assessing how various important 
regulatory and corporate governance provisions impact economic 
welfare. More than three hundred law review articles, including many 
of the most widely cited in corporate law, have referenced Tobin’s q as 
a key measure of the value of corporations,9 as have hundreds of articles 
in the most highly regarded peer-reviewed finance and economics 
journals.10 The trend in citations to Tobin’s q is markedly upward.11 
Recently, articles in leading law reviews have referenced Tobin’s q in 
analyzing such important topics as how firm value has been affected by 
 
 8. See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY 
CREDIT & BANKING 15, 15, 29 (1969) (laying out “a general framework for monetary analysis” in 
which the variable q represents the “valuations of physical assets relative to their replacement 
costs”). 
 9. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 900 n.150 (2005) (describing Tobin’s q as “a standard measure used by financial economists, 
as a proxy for firm value”). A search for “Tobin! /2 q” in the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals” 
database on January 30, 2020, generated 384 results. A search for “Tobin’s q” at the same time in 
the Law “elibrary” of the Social Science Research Network found 4,751 papers. As we discuss, legal 
scholars primarily utilize q as a proxy for firm value and firm performance. See, e.g., Michael 
Klausner, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps Forward and Some 
Steps Not, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 184, 198 n.59 (Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (“Tobin’s Q is a measure of firm value.”). All of the 
studies cited supra notes 2–7 expressly used Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.   
 10. In preparing this article, we conducted a search of articles referencing Tobin’s q in recent 
issues of the three most cited finance journals: volumes 25–72 of the Journal of Finance, volumes 
83–124 of the Journal of Financial Economics, and volumes 20–30 of the Review of Financial 
Studies. We found that 445 articles in these volumes referenced Tobin’s q, with 95 articles 
referencing Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value. 
 11. According to the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals” database, the average and median 
annual citation rate to Tobin’s q in law reviews has been nearly ten times higher during the 2010s 
than it was during the 1990s, and this rate has been increasing throughout the period 1990 
through 2018.  
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hedge fund activism,12 fiduciary duties,13 staggered boards,14 and 
corporate governance.15  
As originally conceived, Tobin’s q, named for the economist 
James Tobin, was an important variable in macroeconomic theory; it 
was defined as the market value of a firm’s assets divided by their 
replacement value.16 However, in corporate law and related areas of 
scholarship, researchers have used a very different, more simplistic 
version of q, which we label “Simple q.” Simple q is essentially a version 
of the “market-to-book” ratio: the market value of a firm’s capital 
divided by its book value.17 Simple q is a ratio and its denominator plays 
an important role in the story of the misuse of Tobin’s q in modern 
corporate law scholarship. 
Our goal here is to lay out for a law review audience the 
historical development of the misuse of Tobin’s q in modern corporate 
law scholarship and demonstrate the basic reasons why using Simple q 
as a proxy for firm value is problematic. Our central point in this article 
is that the scholarly use of Simple q is deeply flawed.18 As a general 
 
 12. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective 
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 
(2017) (discussing results of hedge fund activism studies based on Tobin’s q); K.J. Martijn Cremers, 
Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund Activism, Firm Valuation, and Stock 
Returns (Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [https://perma.cc/59QB-3XLL] (using Tobin’s q to examine effect 
on firm value from hedge fund activism).  
 13. See Sean J. Griffith & Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts and Shareholder Value, 84 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1035 n.41 (2017) (referencing studies based on Tobin’s q in the second 
paragraph of the main body of the article). 
 14. See Amihud et al., supra note 3 (using q to find that a staggered board has no significant 
effect on firm value); Cremers et al., supra note 3 (using q to find that the relationship between 
staggered boards and firm value is heterogeneous); Catan & Klausner, supra note 3 (also using q 
to find that staggered boards have minimal effect on firm value). 
 15. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017) (discussing corporate governance studies based 
on Tobin’s q). 
 16. See Tobin, supra note 8 (setting forth the analytical approach that serves as the point of 
origination for Tobin’s q); see also William C. Brainard & James Tobin, Pitfalls in Financial Model-
Building 9 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 244, 1968), https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/ 
default/files/files/pub/d02/d0244.pdf [https://perma.cc/85LR-XMBJ] (“One of the basic theoretical 
propositions motivating the model is that the market valuation of equities, relative to the 
replacement cost of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of new 
investment.”). 
 17. More specifically, scholars have used a simplified version of q in which the only market 
value estimate is that of a firm’s equity securities; the market value of other securities (e.g., debt 
and preferred stock) as well as the replacement value of assets are derived from book values. As 
we demonstrate below, this simplified version of q is seriously flawed, and does not provide an 
accurate estimate of firm value. Nevertheless, Simple q has become standard in the literature. We 
discuss the evolution of Simple q from Tobin’s q in Part I. See infra Part I.  
 18. In terms of the scholarly use of Simple q, our critique is focused on the empirical corporate 
finance literature. In addition, there also is a theoretical literature addressing Simple q in a 
general equilibrium economic framework: scholars applying this framework have concluded that 
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matter, Tobin’s q, in any specification, is not a good measure of the 
value of corporations, either in theory or in practice. James Tobin did 
not envision that scholars would use this measure to assess firm value, 
and it is not fit for that purpose, particularly in its currently used 
simplified form. When researchers began adopting a market-to-book 
estimate of q as the dependent variable in empirical studies of firms, 
some scholars warned about its inaccuracy, bias, and variability.19 
Notwithstanding these warnings, academics continued to use market-
to-book estimates, often without questioning their accuracy or meaning. 
We begin in Part I by tracing the history of Tobin’s q within the 
corporate law and finance literature. Our historical account reveals how 
the use of Tobin’s q in this literature arose from untested assertions in 
a handful of papers during the early 1980s, when a few scholars argued 
that the value of a corporation’s assets might exceed their replacement 
value due to superior management, despite other possible explanations 
(e.g., monopoly power, temporary first mover advantages, intellectual 
property rights, etc.). Our historical critique explores how these early 
papers laid the foundation for the assumption that Tobin’s q necessarily 
reflects firm value. Part I also explores how Tobin’s q morphed into 
Simple q, despite clear warnings about the shortcomings of using a 
market-to-book proxy as an estimate for Tobin’s q. 
In Part II we explore some specific flaws in the assumption that 
Tobin’s q is an appropriate measure of the value of corporations. First, 
we assess various interpretations of Tobin’s q as a measure of firm value 
and explain several flaws associated with these interpretations. These 
flaws follow naturally from our historical critique. 
Second, we examine some econometric problems associated with 
the use of Simple q, detailing how the use of Simple q as a dependent 
variable can produce biased coefficient estimates in linear regressions. 
Substituting book value for replacement costs in the denominator can 
generate statistical bias, both from the aggregation of assets and the 
omission of assets (particularly intangible assets, such as intellectual 
property). Simply put, firms with relatively high intangible assets 
 
Simple q is a mean-reverting function associated with both the value premium and the volatility 
of stock returns. See, e.g., Giovanni Walter Puopolo, The Dynamics of Tobin’s q (Centre for Studies 
in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 286, 2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e62/ 
6dc7ced4b4d638d7ec1b35fe6a7f7921da24.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TAK-VY5T] (concluding that 
Simple q is mean reverting); see also Patrick Bolton, Hui Chen & Neng Wang, A Unified Theory of 
Tobin’s q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management, 66 J. FIN. 1545 (2011) 
(proposing a model of how external financing costs influence firm investment). 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 109–114 (discussing Perfect & Wiles’ analysis of 
several different proxies for Tobin’s q, including Simple q).  
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generally will have higher measures of Simple q.20 Moreover, because 
this measurement error affects the denominator of Simple q, 
conventional approaches to control for bias from aggregation and 
omission (e.g., by adding a covariate that proxies for intangible assets) 
will be ineffective. As we show, even when scholars acknowledge that 
Simple q may contain measurement error, they have not recognized this 
denominator-related statistical challenge, leading them to rely on 
empirical solutions that do not address the risk of bias. 
Third, we discuss a fact that might surprise many researchers: 
Simple q is inversely associated with the following year’s annual 
returns. This inverse association raises serious questions for studies 
that interpret an increase in Simple q as an increase in firm value, 
especially firm value over time.21 We argue that scholars should 
explicitly consider the inverse relationship between Simple q and 
subsequent returns, and the connection between this puzzle and other 
related literatures, including financial asset pricing. Most notably, the 
reciprocal of Simple q—the ratio of book value to market value—is 
similar to a fundamental risk factor in the Fama-French asset pricing 
model and its progeny, which we discuss in detail below; this similarity 
and the relationship between Simple q and returns are not mentioned 
in the literature relying on Simple q as a proxy for firm value.22 
In Part III, we show that our critique of Simple q matters. We 
do so by examining the results of an especially influential corporate 
governance study by Harvard Law School professors Lucian Bebchuk, 
 
 20. The reason is straightforward arithmetic: if the denominator is lower because it omits 
intangibles, the overall measure will involve division by a lower number, and therefore Simple q 
will be higher. Moreover, because firms’ investments in intangibles vary, both by firm and over 
time, conventional statistical approaches are problematic. For example, as we show in Appendix 
A and discuss below, unbooked intangible assets are positively associated with Simple q, even 
holding constant industry- and firm-fixed effects. See infra app. A. Within the finance literature, 
Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have developed a modified version of Tobin’s q, which they refer to 
as Total q, to attempt to address the measurement error bias that arises from the market valuing 
a firm’s intangible assets even though intangible assets are not part of balance sheet assets and 
are highly serially correlated. See Ryan H. Peters & Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the 
Investment-q Relation, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 251, 269 (2017) (“This bias is probably most severe in the 
standard regressions that omit intangible capital, as omitting intangible capital is an important 
source of measurement error, and a firm’s intangible capital stock is highly serially correlated.”). 
Total q includes in the denominator an estimate of a firm’s intangible assets, making it potentially 
less problematic than Simple q. But Total q suffers from additional limitations as it is simply based 
on the firm’s past expenditures on research and development and a thirty percent share of its prior 
selling, general, and administrative expenditures. 
 21. See, e.g., Cremers et al., supra note 3, at 423 (finding that, among innovative firms, 
adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value as proxied by q and 
concluding that “in more innovative firms . . . adopting (removing) a staggered board is associated 
with an increase (decrease) in long-term firm value”). 
 22. See, e.g., Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks 
and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993) (finding that book-market ratios are significantly associated 
with equity returns). 
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Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell.23 Their paper relies heavily on Simple 
q and contributed to a wave of papers examining the relationship 
between Simple q and various corporate governance interventions. 
While we can replicate their findings using Simple q, our replication 
study demonstrates that these findings disappear when we use an 
alternative measure for Tobin’s q that seeks to correct for the omission 
of intangible assets in Simple q. This alternative measure suffers from 
problems similar to Simple q’s, such as aggregating all of a firm’s assets; 
it also imposes strict assumptions in estimating intangible assets. 
Accordingly, we do not endorse its use as a solution to the problems 
posed by Simple q. On the contrary, our replication study simply 
underscores the fragility of empirical findings relying on any q proxy 
given the simple fact that the denominator of true q is unobservable. 
Consequently, all q proxies measure it with error, and as we discuss, 
using such a mismeasured ratio as a dependent variable in linear 
regression makes the resulting estimates especially susceptible to bias. 
Finally, we also show in Part III how the story of the use and 
misuse of Tobin’s q in corporate governance research provides an 
important insight into the current “replication crisis” within the social 
sciences. Over the past several years, researchers across a range of 
disciplines have been unable to replicate a number of notable empirical 
findings due to both intentional data falsification as well as selective 
reporting of data and results.24 Interventions meant to address this 
crisis have focused almost exclusively on methods that can enhance the 
likelihood that a study is replicable—a concern that, in the context of 
scientific reasoning, implicates a study’s reliability. Yet these 
interventions are ill-equipped to address the empirical problems that 
arise when a measure fails to measure what it purports to measure, as 
is the case with Simple q. The latter concern implicates a study’s 
validity, and, as we discuss, efforts to enhance a study’s reliability can 
paradoxically serve to encourage reliance on an invalid measure. Our 
goal here is to expose Simple q as an invalid measure and, in the 
process, discourage scholars from relying on it as a proxy for firm 
value.25 
 
 23. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5. 
 24. See An Open, Large-Scale, Collaborative Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of 
Psychological Science, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 657 (2012) [hereinafter Effort to Estimate the 
Reproducibility of Psychological Science] (describing a large-scale replication project within 
psychology); Caren M. Rotello, Evan Heit & Chad Dubé, When More Data Steer Us Wrong: 
Replications with the Wrong Dependent Measure Perpetuate Erroneous Conclusions, 22 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 944 (2015) (discussing the problems of replication and 
misinterpretation plaguing psychological studies). 
 25. For scholars interested in examining how various regulatory and corporate governance 
provisions relate to firm value, we recommend alternative techniques that do not rely on any 
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In sum, we uncover the flawed assumption in many of the most 
important studies in corporate law: the assumption that the market-to-
book ratio is an appropriate measure of the value of corporations. As we 
demonstrate, this ratio does not mean what many scholars seem to 
think it means. In our view, without more robust testing, the 
conclusions in corporate law that rely on market-to-book estimates for 
Tobin’s q as a dependent variable are unsound and should not be the 
basis for academic inquiry or policy decisions. Instead, scholars and 
policymakers should approach studies based on Tobin’s q with caution. 
Our examination of modern corporate law scholarship connects 
to a broader phenomenon: the emergence of path-dependent yet 
haphazard ideas in intellectual history.26 We hope to follow other 
scholarship that shows how some ideas gain traction in academia but 
later are exposed as inaccurate.27 Our hope is that, in the future, 
scholars will look back on the flawed assumption in modern corporate 
law scholarship as an interesting historical anecdote, a surprising 
wrong turn, but one that has been superseded by more careful, 
scientifically justified analysis in empirical law and finance.  
 
version of Tobin’s q, and instead evaluate securities returns and direct estimates of firm value. We 
find a promising example of the use of direct estimates of firm value in the accounting literature, 
where scholars have long eschewed using Tobin’s q, and instead measure improvements in firm 
value directly by using a firm’s market value of equity. See, e.g., Mary E. Barth & Sanjay Kallapur, 
The Effects of Cross-Sectional Scale Differences on Regression Results in Empirical Accounting 
Research, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 527 (1996) (investigating bias resulting from scale differences 
in regressions based on market values); Mary E. Barth & Greg Clinch, Scale Effects in Capital 
Markets-Based Accounting Research, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 253 (2009) (assessing simulations of 
the effects of firm size in regressions based on market values); James A. Ohlson & Seil Kim, Linear 
Valuation Without OLS: The Theil-Sun Estimation Approach, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 395 (2015) 
(discussing modifications of regressions based on market values to account for scale). In related 
work, we also explore how using the natural logarithm of Simple q solves many of the empirical 
challenges of using Simple q as an outcome variable in a linear regression framework. However, 
to avoid imposing an assumption that the elasticity of a firm’s market value to its book value is 
exactly one, a researcher should also include the natural log of a firm’s book value as a covariate 
in the regression specification. As we illustrate there, adopting this approach is equivalent to using 
the natural log of the numerator of Simple q—a direct estimate of firm value—to estimate the 
effect of a regressor of interest on firm value. See Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Ratio 
Problem (Jan. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 26. The concept of supposed truths that are false and therefore should be rejected has existed 
for centuries, and arguably emerged into widespread parlance from the King James Bible, which 
included the admonition from the Apostle Paul to his young protégé, Timothy: “But refuse profane 
and old wives’ fables, and exercise thyself rather unto godliness.” 1 Timothy 4:7 (King James). 
 27. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of 
the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16–24 (2007) 
(describing the emergence and reliance on the implicit minority discount (“IMD”) by courts 
conducting a corporate valuation using a comparable company analysis, despite lacking any 
support for the IMD within the academic finance literature). 
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I. A HISTORY OF TOBIN’S Q 
This Part sets forth a history of Tobin’s q, beginning with its 
original use and then turning to more recent simplified specifications, 
including Simple q. Although Simple q is widely used in corporate law 
scholarship, its evolution from the original use of Tobin’s q in 
macroeconomics has not previously been described in the literature. 
The history of how Tobin’s q came to be seen as a proxy for firm value 
and how it subsequently transformed into Simple q illustrates many of 
the drawbacks of using Simple q in corporate law scholarship. 
A. The Classical Macroeconomic View: 1968–1976 
Although the variable Tobin’s q is typically attributed to the 
economist James Tobin, the theoretical construct underlying it 
originated from joint work between Tobin and William C. Brainard,28 a 
colleague of Tobin’s at Yale. In 1968, Brainard and Tobin introduced a 
theoretical model of an economy in which one central proposition was 
that “the market valuation of equities, relative to the replacement cost 
of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of 
investment.”29 They noted that investment in physical assets is 
stimulated when physical capital is more highly valued in the market 
than it costs to produce, and investment is discouraged when physical 
capital is valued in the market below its replacement cost.30 Brainard 
and Tobin were focused on explaining fluctuations in investment, so 
they intuitively compared the market yield on equity with the real 
returns to physical investment. In their 1968 paper, however, they did 
not specify a variable with a letter to describe this concept. The concept 
was not yet named “q.” 
The setting in which Brainard and Tobin introduced the 
conceptual underpinnings of q obviously was quite different than the 
setting in which the concept is used in empirical law and finance 
scholarship. The authors were comparing market prices with the 
 
 28. Although Tobin ultimately came to receive naming credit for q, Brainard also left a 
considerable, though q-less, legacy, including the William C. Brainard Professorship of Economics 
at Yale, where he served as provost from 1981 to 1986 and was chair of the economics department. 
See Yale Officer: Provosts, YALE U. LIBR., https://guides.library.yale.edu/c.php?g= 
296064&p=1973564 (last updated Jan. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5CT8-93Z6] (listing Brainard’s 
tenure as Yale provost). Among Brainard’s Ph.D. students is David F. Swensen, the long-time Yale 
chief investment officer. Chair Pays Tribute to Economist William Brainard’s Leadership, GIVING 
TO YALE (Dec. 19, 2008), https://giving.yale.edu/news/chair-pays-tribute-economist-william-
brainards-leadership [https://perma.cc/QHZ8-386M].  
 29. Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9. 
 30. Id. 
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replacement cost of physical assets in order to describe fluctuations in 
investment that were relevant for the purposes of macroeconomic 
modeling. Indeed, their paper was specifically directed toward 
monetary economists, and the relevance of the relationship between 
market prices and the replacement cost of physical assets was to 
explain how monetary policy might affect investment in the real 
economy. In their words, this relationship was “the sole linkage in the 
model through which financial events, including monetary policies, 
affect the real economy.”31    
A year later, in 1969, Tobin published A General Equilibrium 
Approach to Monetary Theory. In developing the macroeconomic model 
in that paper, Tobin reiterated the concept of market value versus 
replacement costs and stated that he would “allow the value of existing 
capital goods, or of titles to them, to diverge from their current 
reproduction cost.”32 Tobin then used the letter q to describe the ratio 
of the market value of capital goods and their replacement costs.33 
Because Tobin allowed q to depart from a one-to-one ratio, he noted how 
this variation could be interpreted in then-current versions of the 
Investment Saving–Liquidity Preference Money Supply (“IS–LM”) 
macroeconomic model.34 In Tobin’s formulation, if q equaled one, the 
standard IS–LM curves held.35 But if q were greater than or less than 
one, there would be a short-run disequilibrium.36 The long-run 
equilibrium would then require some form of adjustment, so that q 
would move in the direction of one.37 Tobin illustrated the effects of 
changes in q on the IS–LM model in Figure 3 of his 1969 paper,38 which 
is reproduced from the original below.  
 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Tobin, supra note 8, at 19. 
 33. Id. at 21. We follow the literature in using the terms “physical capital” and “capital goods” 
interchangeably. 
 34. See id. (observing that “equation (I.5) can be interpreted as a species of the standard 
Keynesian LM curve”). 
 35. Id. at 23.   
 36. Id. at 22–23. 
 37. Id. at 23. 
 38. Id. at 22 fig.3. 
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Tobin cautioned in his concluding remarks that “[t]he models 
discussed here were meant to be illustrative only, and to give meaning 
to some general observations about monetary analysis.”39 Tobin 
concluded that the key insight associated with the introduction of q 
related to monetary policy: the major way for monetary policy to affect 
aggregate demand was “by changing the valuation of physical assets 
relative to their replacement costs.”40 In other words, the context for the 
introduction of q was as a tool in the theory of monetary policy. Tobin’s 
q was truly “Macro q”: it had nothing to do with measuring the effects 
of a change in policy or a shock on relative prices; instead, it was a 
potential lever that might be used to change aggregate demand (the 
dependent variable in Tobin’s model). In general terms, Tobin’s q 
described how financial markets affected investment and economic 
activity. Put another way, Tobin’s q began its life as a potential 
independent variable on the right side of financial equations, not as a 
dependent variable on the left. 
 
 39. Id. at 29. 
 40. Id.  
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According to Tobin, the deviation of q from one was an important 
short-term determinant of investment. Specifically, in Tobin’s model, if 
q were above one, the value of physical assets would be relatively high. 
Firms would invest a greater amount, because they would benefit from 
buying assets at a lower cost than their market value. Accordingly, in 
Tobin’s model, when q was greater than one, investment should 
increase. Conversely, when q was less than one, investment should 
decrease. In the long run, adjustments in capital investment should 
occur, so that a firm’s actual physical capital or capital goods should 
approach the optimal level.41 
Tobin’s q remained an important concept in macroeconomic 
theory throughout the 1970s and it continues to play a role in that field 
today.42 However, Tobin’s q did not play any role in corporate law or 
corporate governance at its inception. 
B. Early Interpretations from Empirical Finance: 1977–1984 
Not surprisingly, the first empirical studies using Tobin’s q 
focused on examining the sensitivity of investment outlays to changes 
in the incentive to invest.43 Indeed, the stagflation of the 1970s made 
Tobin’s theory particularly attractive to scholars seeking to understand 
how factors other than interest rates might affect corporate investment. 
Similar considerations motivated pioneering work on how tax policy 
might affect corporate investment through changes in Tobin’s q.44 In 
keeping with this macroeconomic focus, these early papers examined 
aggregate levels of Tobin’s q across the entire economy, generally using 
federal flow of funds data to estimate Tobin’s q.45 Scholars did not focus 
on Tobin’s q at the individual firm level.  
 
 41. Note that Tobin’s model explicitly contemplated that in the short run the measure of q 
would fluctuate. Indeed, the explanatory power of Tobin’s model derived in part from the 
fluctuations in q. 
 42. Tobin refined his macroeconomic model during the 1970s. See James Tobin, Monetary 
Policies and the Economy: The Transmission Mechanism, 37 S. ECON. J. 421 (1978). 
 43. See e.g., George M. von Furstenberg, Corporate Investment: Does Market Valuation 
Matter in the Aggregate?, 1977 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 347 (empirically examining 
whether the q ratio predicts investment by nonfinancial corporations). 
 44. See e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory 
Approach, 1981 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67 (examining corporate investment as a 
function of changes in tax-adjusted q). 
 45. See e.g., Fumio Hayashi, Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation, 
50 ECONOMETRICA 213, 214 (1982) (“[W]e calculate modified q from data on average q taking into 
account the actual U.S. tax system and estimate a simple linear investment function.”); Summers, 
supra note 44, at 85 (noting that their “equations and diagram[s] can be interpreted as referring 
to the entire economy rather than an individual firm”); von Furstenberg, supra note 43, at 347 
(describing an intention to explore the “influence on aggregate investment behavior” of “[b]alance-
sheet variables and stock-market appraisals,” which, at that time, remained “less clear”).  
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During this same time, in a different area of research, scholars 
in empirical corporate finance, who traditionally had used accounting-
based measures to assess firm profitability, began raising several 
objections to those measures.46 In particular, scholars expressed 
concern that accounting rates of return measured only past profits and 
did not reflect expectations about the future.47 Accounting measures did 
not reflect assessments of risk, either.48 Moreover, they were sensitive 
to inflation, a major concern during the late 1970s, when inflation rates 
and nominal interest rates were very high.49 At this time, financial 
economists first considered introducing Tobin’s q onto new scholarly 
turf: to evaluate firm performance. Might Tobin’s q be better than 
accounting-based measures? 
A potential answer appeared in a 1981 article by Eric 
Lindenberg, a researcher at AT&T, and Stephen Ross, an economist at 
Yale (and a colleague of James Tobin).50 Lindenberg and Ross titled 
their article Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, but they 
opened the article more modestly, by referencing the use of Tobin’s q in 
macroeconomic models, not industrial organization.51 They noted the 
important intuition arising from Tobin’s macroeconomic model that if 
firms took all profitable opportunities when the value of their new 
capital investment exceeded its cost (in other words, when Tobin’s q was 
greater than one), then the marginal value of Tobin’s q should converge 
to one.52 This reference, and the intuition backing it, had become 
standard in the macroeconomics literature. 
But then Lindenberg and Ross said something extraordinary: 
“We will employ this argument peripherally below, but our focus is 
somewhat different. Our interest is in the cross-sectional value of q and 
 
 46. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of 
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 84 (1983) (demonstrating that accounting 
rates of return are not a reliable proxy for the economic rate of return); Ezra Solomon, Alternative 
Rate of Return Concepts and Their Implications for Utility Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 65, 80 (1970) (critiquing the prevalent mistake of assuming that book rate of return measures 
and discounted-cash flow (“DCF”) rate of return measures are estimates of the same thing); 
Thomas R. Stauffer, The Measurement of Corporate Rates of Return: A Generalized Formulation, 
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 434, 467 (1971) (demonstrating that “the accounting rate of return 
is generally a very poor proxy for the economic or DCF rate of return”). 
 47. See Solomon, supra note 46, at 65 (showing that returns based on book value and returns 
based on discounted cash flow rarely generate similar results). 
 48. See Stauffer, supra note 46 (analyzing factors associated with bias in accounting returns). 
 49. See Fisher & McGowan, supra note 46, at 82 (noting that accounting practices do not 
incorporate allowances for inflation). 
 50. See Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen A. Ross, Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 
54 J. BUS. 1 (1981). 
 51. See id. at 1–2. 
 52.  See id. at 2. 
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its implications for industrial organization in general . . . .”53 In other 
words, Lindenberg and Ross were transporting Tobin’s macroeconomic 
q to a new context, where the variable might take on entirely different 
meanings and functions. 
Instead of focusing on the effects on capital investment when q 
differed from one, as Tobin and his followers had, Lindenberg and Ross 
described the range of reasons why Tobin’s q might differ from one. 
Their analysis of why the variable might differ from one included the 
prospect of Ricardian and monopoly rents, which presumably would 
lead to asset market values that were higher than their replacement 
values.54 Thus, Lindenberg and Ross suggested that Tobin’s q might be 
useful not only in examining levels of investment, but also in assessing 
firm profitability and monopoly power. The implicit conclusion that 
firms with a high value of Tobin’s q were more profitable was asserted 
but not rigorously defended.  
Most importantly, Lindenberg and Ross developed a procedure 
for calculating Tobin’s q. They created a database of Tobin’s q estimates 
for a large sample of firms and then used it to examine the dispersion 
of supercompetitive market power across different companies and 
industries.55 The implication of their pathbreaking paper was that other 
scholars also could use Tobin’s q to examine and assess differences 
among firms. In other words, they provided a template for how Tobin’s 
q could be measured and evaluated for individual firms. 
The new Lindenberg and Ross formulation of Tobin’s q was 
catnip for empirical corporate finance researchers. During the early 
1980s, researchers began advocating Tobin’s q as a measure that was 
superior to the range of accounting-based measures that scholars had 
been using to assess firm profitability.56 By adopting and then adapting 
Tobin’s q from the theoretical macroeconomics literature, empirical 
researchers in corporate finance potentially had found a more accurate 
measure to use in assessing firm profitability.  
Following Lindenberg and Ross, finance scholars began to 
embrace Tobin’s q.57 It offered several advantages compared to 
 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. See id. at 2–3 (proposing reasons why “the actual q value of even a competitive firm may 
differ from unity”). 
 55. See id. at 10 tbl.1. 
 56. See, e.g., Henry McFarland, Evaluating q as an Alternative to the Rate of Return in 
Measuring Profitability, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 614, 614 (1988) (citing the literature assessing 
firm profitability). 
 57. Mark Hirschey, Market Structure and Market Value, 58 J. BUS. 89 (1985) (reexamining 
the relationship between market structure and monopoly profits as proxied by Tobin’s q); 
McFarland, supra note 56 (exploring whether accounting estimates of q are less erroneous than 
accounting rates of return); Michael A. Salinger, Tobin’s q, Unionization, and the Concentration-
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accounting measures. Because the numerator of Tobin’s q included 
market value, it reflected expectations about the future. Market prices 
also reflected assessments of risk, because they were influenced by 
expectations about the variance of future profits. Replacement cost, the 
denominator of Tobin’s q, was difficult to calculate, but Lindenberg and 
Ross had demonstrated it could be estimated based on 
contemporaneous data. Throughout the early and mid-1980s, several 
scholarly articles discussed the extent to which Tobin’s q might be a 
viable substitute for purely accounting-based metrics. We turn next to 
this research. 
C. The Divergence Between Macroeconomics and Empirical Finance: 
1984–1992  
During the 1980s, as Tobin’s q gained traction among financial 
economists as a measure of firm performance, two notable trends 
emerged that highlighted a growing divide between the use of Tobin’s q 
by macroeconomists and financial economists. The first difference was 
conceptual; the second was definitional. 
First, consistent with the early macroeconomic literature testing 
Tobin’s original theory, several macroeconomists explored the 
relationship between Tobin’s q and corporate investment. Their papers 
largely reflected the original conception of Tobin’s q (as articulated by 
Tobin).58 However, an important theoretical modification was made in 
1982 by Fumio Hayashi, who sought to connect formally the insights of 
Tobin with the neoclassical theory of investment.59 This latter theory 
had generally focused on modeling a firm’s investment in its physical 
capital as an optimization challenge in which a firm sought to maximize 
returns to scale while accounting for “installation costs.”60 Recognizing 
the theoretical importance of installation costs, Hayashi formally 
modified Tobin’s theory to account for them: in this new “q-theory of 
investment,” a firm decides the optimal rate of investment through 
 
Profits Relationship, 15 RAND J. ECON. 159 (1984) (using Tobin’s q to examine the link between 
market structure and monopoly profits); Michael Smirlock et al., Tobin’s q and the Structure-
Performance Relationship, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1051 (1984) (using q to measure firm rents). 
 58. See, e.g., Steven M. Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Peterson, Financing 
Constraints and Corporate Investment, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 141 (studying 
the impact of financing constraints on corporate investment by individual firms after controlling 
for q); Michael A. Salinger & Lawrence H. Summers, Tax Reform and Corporate Investment: A 
Microeconomic Simulation Study, in BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION METHODS IN TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 
247 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983) (developing a methodology for simulating the effects of alternative 
corporate tax reforms on corporate investment by individual firms). 
 59. See Hayashi, supra note 45.  
 60. Id. at 215. 
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knowledge of Tobin’s q and the firm’s installation costs.61 Notably, given 
the focus on a firm’s investment in physical capital and installation 
costs, Tobin’s q within this literature represented the market value of 
the firm relative to the replacement costs of its physical capital. 
In contrast, within finance circles the possibility that Tobin’s q 
might reflect a firm’s ability to extract economic rents was increasingly 
conflated with the possibility that Tobin’s q reflected firm value. An 
article commonly cited as pioneering the use of Tobin’s q in this regard 
is Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny’s 1988 study of 
the relationship between management ownership and firm value.62 In 
examining a cross section of 371 firms using data from 1980, they found 
that Tobin’s q rose with management ownership in firms where 
management held a small percentage of equity, but declined in firms 
where management held a larger percentage.63 Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny assumed that high Tobin’s q firms were associated with higher 
expected future profits,64 an assumption we examine in Part II. 
It is worth noting that the version of Tobin’s q used by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny is markedly different from the Simple q market-
to-book ratio used today. First, they used actual estimates of 
replacement costs, from the 1980 Griliches R&D Master file, rather 
than book value, to estimate the denominator of Tobin’s q.65 This 
financial dataset was created by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research for a sample of firms during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and provided a variety of metrics one could use to estimate actual 
replacement values.66 Second, they used actual estimates of the market 
values of preferred stock and long-term debt rather than book value to 
 
 61. The “q-theory of investment” remains provocative given the informational content it 
attributes to Tobin’s q. As Hayashi noted, “All the information about the demand curve for the 
firm’s output and the production function that are relevant to the investment decision is 
summarized by q.” Id. at 218. Additionally, in the neoclassical theory of investment, note that 
firms make investment decisions on the margin—that is, an optimizing firm evaluates the benefits 
of investing in an additional unit of capital relative to the costs of acquiring and installing an 
additional unit of capital. As such, in applying Tobin’s work to the neoclassical framework, the 
relevant metric was a firm’s marginal q (the ratio of the market value of an additional unit of 
capital to its replacement cost) rather than its overall, or average, q. While marginal q is an 
unobservable construct, Hayashi’s work established conditions under which marginal and average 
q were the same, thereby opening the door to rigorous statistical testing of the q-theory of 
investment. Id. 
 62. See Morck et al., supra note 6. 
 63. See id. at 311 (summarizing the study’s results). 
 64. Id. at 312 n.12. 
 65. Id. at 296. 
 66. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The R&D Master File Documentation (NBER Technical Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 72, 1988), https://www.nber.org/papers/t0072.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEA9-
LVRQ].  
Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:12 PM 
2020] THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q 371 
estimate their Tobin’s q numerators.67 Third, they extensively 
discussed the potential bias associated with their Tobin’s q estimates.68 
(Scholars later largely abandoned all of these practices and instead 
simply used book values for all measures except stock prices, without 
discussion.69) 
However, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny did not show the same 
degree of care in describing their rationale for using Tobin’s q as a 
measure for firm value. In explaining the choice of Tobin’s q as the 
outcome variable, the authors explained that “Tobin’s Q is high when 
the firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to physical capital, 
such as monopoly power [Lindenberg and Ross (1981)], goodwill, a stock 
of patents, or good managers.”70 They noted that high Tobin’s q might 
arise from any of these sources of “intangible assets,” and then simply 
asserted that Tobin’s q reflected management performance and, 
therefore, firm value. The boldness of this unsubstantiated claim, 
published in 1988, makes it worth quoting in its entirety: “Although Q 
is undoubtedly a very noisy signal of management performance, we 
believe it is well-suited to our purpose. Because we are interested in the 
predictable effects of a firm’s ownership structure on its value, it seems 
natural to look at the cross-sectional relationship between ownership 
and value.”71 
In two sentences, Tobin’s q was thus transformed into a proxy 
for management’s effect on firm value. Despite the uncertainty as to 
why the measure might be “well-suited” to Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny’s purpose or “natural” for examining the relationship between 
ownership and “value,” this notion of Tobin’s q as reflecting firm value 
took root.72 By the early 1990s, prominent papers in finance were citing, 
though not analyzing or critiquing, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
and Lindenberg and Ross (1981) as the justification for using Tobin’s q 
as a proxy for firm value.73  
 
 67. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296. 
 68. See id. at 295–307 (providing extensive discussion of the above factors). 
 69. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities 
Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 169, 177 (1997):  
We measure average Tobin’s Q as the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets (item 6) where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus 
the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity 
(item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). 
 70. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Henri Servaes, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409, 417–18 
(1991) (interpreting q as a “measure of managerial performance”); see also Benjamin E. Hermalin 
& Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm 
Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101, 103–05 (1991) (using q as a proxy for firm value for estimating 
Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:12 PM 
372 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2:353 
In addition to the conceptual differences in the use of Tobin’s q 
in macroeconomics and finance, scholars in these two areas adopted 
distinct definitions of Tobin’s q. The fault line between the two camps 
was generally whether one was examining the q theory of investment 
(the macroeconomic approach) or the determinants of firm value (the 
finance approach). Macroeconomists examining the effects of Tobin’s q 
on investment behavior typically defined Tobin’s q as the ratio of the 
market value of a firm’s stock of tangible capital to that stock’s 
replacement value.74 This “Macro q” ratio resembles the original 
framework of Brainard and Tobin, who had sought to explain the 
incentives to invest in physical capital.75 The macroeconomic 
formulation was also consistent with the idea introduced by Hayashi 
that installation costs might deter a high Tobin’s q firm from investing. 
In contrast, finance scholars defined Tobin’s q as the ratio of the 
market value of the firm’s outstanding securities to the replacement 
cost of all of the firm’s assets, not only its physical capital. Although 
early papers that used Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value, such as 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), limited the denominator of Tobin’s 
q to the replacement value of a firm’s plant and inventories, by the early 
1990s finance scholars were including all of a firm’s assets in the q 
denominator—both tangible and (to the extent reported) intangible.76 
Other authors were even less specific about the extent to which their 
calculations included particular assets: for example, the first footnote 
of a prominent paper published in 1990 in the Journal of Financial 
Economics simply notes that a “variation of the Lindenberg and Ross 
(1981) algorithm is used to compute the market value of the firm (debt 
plus equity) and the replacement value of its assets. A description of the 
procedure to compute these values is available from the authors.”77 
Overall, empirical finance scholars during this time shifted their focus 
 
the effect of board composition on firm value); McConnell & Servaes, supra note 6, at 599 (using q 
as an outcome variable for estimating changes in firm value due to various measures of ownership). 
The Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny paper was also the primary basis for using q as a proxy for firm 
value in the important 2003 article by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, which we 
discuss in Part II. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126 (referring to Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny’s study).  
 74. See, e.g., Fazzari et al., supra note 58, at 141 app. B (defining Tobin’s q to be equal to 
(market value of equity + preferred stock debt + debt – market value of inventories) / (replacement 
value of property, plant, and equipment)).  
 75. See Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9 (“One of the basic theoretical propositions 
motivating the model is that the market valuation of equities, relative to the replacement cost of 
the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of new investment.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 73, at 105 (“The denominator of q, the 
replacement value of the firm’s assets, has three main components: the market value of capital 
stock, the market value of inventories, and other assets.”). 
 77. McConnell & Servaes, supra note 6, at 600 n.1.  
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to a firm’s assets overall, a move that was in many ways predictable 
given the emerging assumption that Tobin’s q reflected a firm’s overall 
performance and value.   
This broader formulation of “Finance q” in the literature had 
intuitive appeal, but it represents yet another departure from Tobin’s 
original theory. Brainard and Tobin had noted that “[t]here are many 
kinds of physical capital and many markets where existing stocks are 
valued,”78 implying that in an ideal world, each different type of asset 
should have a different Tobin’s q. Similarly, subsequent work by Fumio 
Hayashi and Tohru Inoue noted that “one has to invoke a very stringent 
set of assumptions including the Hicks aggregation condition [that all 
of the firm’s assets are perfect substitutes in the production process] to 
derive a one-to-one relation between the sum of investments and Q that 
is independent of the composition of investments.”79 The tendency to 
measure firm value by aggregating together assets as dissimilar as 
capital goods, inventories, and intangibles accordingly fails this 
condition.80  
In other words, the macroeconomists’ analysis of Tobin’s q, 
because it was focused on investment, was circumspect about 
aggregating firm assets for comparison: tangibles and intangibles were 
apples and oranges for the purposes of assessing changes in investment 
and should not be lumped together. In contrast, financial economists 
saw their version of Tobin’s q as a way to analyze a firm’s assets in the 
aggregate, both tangibles and intangibles (as well as cash, investment 
securities, accounts receivable, and so on), and accordingly were 
comfortable grouping disparate categories of assets into one measure, 
notwithstanding the questionable theoretical basis for doing so. 
D. The Adoption of Simple Q as a Measure of the Value of 
Corporations: 1994–Present 
The most significant split between what we have labeled “Macro 
q” versus “Finance q” was the move by empirical corporate finance 
researchers to use a simplified calculation of Tobin’s q. As we have 
noted, Simple q is, essentially, a market-to-book ratio: the market value 
of a firm’s securities divided by the firm’s book value of assets. Today, 
corporate finance scholars routinely and sanguinely use Simple q 
 
 78. Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9. 
 79. Fumio Hayashi & Tohru Inoue, The Relation Between Firm Growth and Q with Multiple 
Capital Goods: Theory and Evidence from Panel Data on Japanese Firms, 59 ECONOMETRICA 731, 
732 (1991). 
 80. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, On the Accuracy of Different Measures of q, 35 FIN. 
MGMT. 5, 9 (2006). 
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largely without question, perhaps because it is wrapped up in the lore 
of “Tobin’s q,” which might mask the fact that it is merely “market-to-
book.”81 The story of how Simple q became so widely accepted is 
surprising, given how many scholars warned, two decades ago, about 
the potential problems with market-to-book estimates of Tobin’s q. 
Macroeconomics scholars resisted simplistic market-to-book 
estimates of Tobin’s q for theoretical reasons and because of 
measurement error and data unavailability, problems that the “Macro 
q” literature continues to address. In contrast, empirical corporate 
finance scholars eagerly swallowed Simple q, methodological problems 
and all. The recent corporate finance literature suggests that the 
adoption of Simple q was straightforward and uncontroversial. In fact, 
it was neither.  
First, consider early versions of the “Finance q” numerator: the 
market value of a firm’s securities. Although market values of the 
common equity of publicly traded firms could be observed during the 
1990s, an accurate measure of Tobin’s q needed to include all of a firm’s 
capital, including preferred stock and debt. The valuations of these 
other slices of capital often had to be estimated, because market prices 
typically were not available.82 Scholars accordingly developed a range 
of approaches to incorporate market-based data to estimate the 
numerator at the firm level, but there were serious measurement 
 
 81. The use of market-to-book ratios elsewhere in the finance literature is not consistent with 
their use in empirical corporate finance. For example, as we describe below, a firm’s market-to-
book ratio has played an important role as one of the central risk factors in the asset pricing 
literature. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing Fama and French’s 
groundbreaking research on asset pricing). In particular, market-to-book ratios are inversely 
related to future returns. As we discuss below, this empirical fact places the use of a de facto 
market-to-book ratio as the proxy for q in tension with the notion that increasing q necessarily 
means increasing long-term firm value. See id. Scholars also have explored the extent to which 
high market-to-book ratios are associated with greater borrowing and lower financing costs. See 
Long Chen & Xinlei Zhao, On the Relation Between the Market-to-Book Ratio, Growth Opportunity, 
and Leverage Ratio, 3 FIN. RES. LETTERS 253, 254 (2006) (showing that the negative relation 
between market-to-book and leverage is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book 
ratios). With limited exceptions, scholars in the empirical finance literature have not addressed 
the extent to which the subset of firms with the highest levels of q might share these same 
empirical relationships. 
 82. W.G. Shepherd, Tobin’s q and the Structure-Performance Relationship, 76 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1205, 1206 (1986); Smirlock et al., supra note 57, at 1058–59. 
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challenges.83 Early efforts to measure “Finance q” included lengthy 
appendices that outlined particular methods, data, and assumptions.84 
Second, consider early versions of the “Finance q” denominator: 
the replacement value of a firm’s capital assets. The market value of a 
firm’s capital assets reflects intangible assets such as customer goodwill 
and technical knowledge, yet readily available accounting and balance-
sheet–based measures of a firm’s assets do not include such values.85 
Accounting measures of asset values are also generally recorded at 
historical cost and then adjusted using depreciation schedules that 
typically do not reflect the true economic depreciation of the firm’s 
assets.86 Firms also have the ability to choose different depreciation 
schedules.  
Moreover, although during the early 1980s many publicly traded 
firms were required to estimate replacement costs for some assets based 
on rules established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
those estimates often were not based on market prices when active 
markets did not exist.87 In addition, after 1984, even these firms were 
no longer required to provide replacement cost estimates; accordingly, 
the National Bureau of Economic Research was unable to augment its 
database for researchers to estimate replacement values for firms. 
Since the mid-1980s, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for 
researchers to calculate reliable estimates of replacement costs for the 
assets of publicly traded firms.88 As a result, there were, and are, 
serious difficulties in estimating the Tobin’s q denominator. 
 
 83. For example, several scholars collected the prices of long-term bonds so that their 
measure did not assume that the market value and book value of debt were the same. These bond 
prices were available then from the Moody’s Bond Record and Standard & Poor’s Bond Guide. See 
Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s q, 23 FIN. MGMT. 70, 71 
n.3 (1994) (describing studies that collected long-term bond prices). In addition, researchers had 
information about the replacement cost of net plant, equipment, and inventories from the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) Regulation 33 Tape, edited by researchers at 
Columbia University. However, that dataset was available only during 1979 to 1984, and only for 
firms with net plant and equipment of more than $120 million. See id. 
 84. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang et al., Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signaling vs. Free 
Cash Flow Hypothesis?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 186 (1989) (describing methodology for estimating 
values of preferred stock, bonds, and replacement costs for purposes of estimating a firm’s Tobin’s 
q); Larry H.P. Lang et al., A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns, 
29 J. FIN ECON. 315, 319 (1991) (using the Lindenberg and Ross algorithm to estimate firms’ 
Tobin’s q); Lindenberg & Ross, supra note 50, at app. (explaining their methodology in defining 
replacement cost). 
 85. See McFarland, supra note 56, at 614–15 (discussing how the omission of intangible 
assets from the book value of assets can bias Tobin’s q). 
 86. Id. at 616. 
 87. Id. at 615 n.4. 
 88. Lang, Stulz, and Walking describe the arduous process of obtaining replacement cost 
estimates, a process that contrasts so sharply with the use of Simple q that it is worth quoting in 
full:  
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Despite these measurement challenges, the growing interest in 
using Tobin’s q in empirical corporate finance inspired scholars to 
search for ways to estimate Tobin’s q to enable its use across a broader 
cross section of firms. These efforts only heightened the measurement 
error. Most notably, in 1994, Kee Chung and Stephen Pruitt set forth a 
simpler version of calculating Tobin’s q based on inputs that were easily 
downloaded from available financial and accounting databases.89 
Chung and Pruitt defined “approximate q” using the following equation: 
 
Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA 
 
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of 
common shares outstanding, PS is the liquidating value of any 
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term 
liabilities net of its short-term assets plus the book value of long-term 
debt, and TA is the book value of the firm’s total assets. In short, 
“approximate q” was nothing more than a slightly modified version of 
the firm’s market-to-book ratio, with book value substituted for market 
value of preferred and debt securities in the numerator. Calculating the 
denominator of Tobin’s q had seemed impossible; suddenly it was a 
snap. 
 
Replacement costs of net plant and equipment and inventories are obtained from the 
FASB regulation 33 tape edited by Columbia University that covers the period 1979–
1984. Although these data are unaudited and firms are allowed considerable discretion 
in their estimates, the data are the best available information on replacement costs. 
Corporations with net plant valued in excess of $120 million were required to report 
replacement costs of plant and inventories to FASB from 1979 to 1984. Consequently, 
no replacement cost data are provided by firms before 1979 or after 1984 or by firms 
with net plant valued at less than 120 million dollars.  
 When firms do not report replacement costs, we use the Lindenberg and Ross 
algorithm to estimate these costs. Plant and equipment are valued by setting up an 
acquisition schedule and adjusting for price level changes and depreciation as suggested 
by Lindenberg and Ross (1889) [sic]. Specifically, for firms listed on the FASB tape, we 
begin with the plant replacement costs closest to 1979 or 1984 as appropriate in the 
Lindenberg and Ross formula for that year. We then work backward or forward using 
the formula to obtain estimates of replacement costs before 1979 or after 1984, 
respectively. We follow Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) and assume the 
technological parameter to be zero.  
 To obtain the replacement costs for smaller firms that do not report these 
replacement costs at all, we assume that the value of plant at the start (1967) is equal 
to book value. Following the work by Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984), we reduce 
the value of plant and equipment by 5% each year to compensate for depreciation and 
then adjust it for the GNP deflator for nonresidential fixed investment. We then use 
the formula proposed by Lindenberg and Ross. If inventories are not reported in the 
FASB 33 tape, we use the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm.  
Larry H.P. Lang et al., Managerial Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from Successful Tender 
Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 153 (1989). 
 89. See Chung & Pruitt, supra note 83, at 71. 
Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:12 PM 
2020] THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q 377 
Unlike “Macro q,” Chung and Pruitt’s “approximate q” entirely 
avoided the need to calculate the replacement value of assets; rather, it 
assumed that the replacement values of plant, equipment, and 
inventories were equal to their book values. Chung and Pruitt also 
simplified the treatment of long-term debt and preferred stock. Instead 
of attempting to calculate market values of debt or preferred stock, their 
measure simply substituted book values for market values of a firm’s 
sources of capital other than common equity. As they noted, this 
approach had a clear advantage over more nuanced estimates of q in 
that “all of these required inputs are readily obtainable from a firm’s 
basic financial and accounting information.”90 
Chung and Pruitt justified their version of Tobin’s q, as 
contrasted with the more complicated Lindenberg-Ross measure, by 
pointing to their measure’s mean, median, and maximum deviations 
from it, which were 6.8 percent, 6.2 percent, and 18.0 percent, 
respectively.91 Chung and Pruitt optimistically concluded that the 
average error of 6.8 percent was tolerable, because it “compare[d] 
extremely favorably with the errors typically observed in other financial 
estimates.”92 They asserted as a justification that “managers would 
gladly accept a contract stipulating a mean (maximum) 6.8 (18.0)% 
error in virtually all of their business decisions.”93 Chung and Pruitt 
also noted that the 6.8 percent error compared favorably to larger errors 
in capital budgeting projections and forecasts, both in the private and 
government sectors, and in forecasts by securities analysts.94  
In short, instead of warning scholars about a 6.8 percent 
estimated error, Chung and Pruitt used the error as a marketing pitch 
for their simplified version of Tobin’s q.95 They asserted that their 
simplified version of Tobin’s q would be particularly important when 
more “theoretically correct” estimates were unavailable.96 They claimed 
that because their simplified version of Tobin’s q used readily available 
balance sheet information, it therefore “should prove of significant 
interest to both academic researchers and financial practitioners.”97  
Chung and Pruitt noted that, although academics frequently 
used Tobin’s q, their “discussions with several senior financial 
managers suggest little, if any, reliance upon q in real-world decision 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 72 (describing the results of their calculations for forty randomly selected firms).  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. See id. at 72–73. 
 95. See id. at 74.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
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analysis.”98 They explained that “the availability of timely and accurate 
[Tobin’s] q data [was] severely limited when compared with known 
sources of other important financial variables, such as beta.”99 However, 
given the ready availability of accounting data for firms, Chung and 
Pruitt imagined that “thousands of corporate financial analysts” might 
one day use their measure of Tobin’s q.100 They added, “Given the 
potential for Tobin’s q to provide valuable insight into a variety of 
important business and financial decisions, it is plausible that 
approximate q or some variation of it may one day play an important 
role in financial analysis,”101 a prediction that seems omniscient in 
hindsight.  
Also in 1994, at the same time Chung and Pruitt were offering 
their simplified version of “approximate q,” Steven Perfect and Kenneth 
Wiles published an analysis of how sensitive the results of empirical 
corporate finance studies were to different versions of Tobin’s q for 
purposes of estimating firm value.102 Perfect and Wiles compared five 
different constructions of Tobin’s q.103 One of the five estimates was qs, 
which they labeled the “simple q ratio.”104 
Although the methodologies used to calculate the five measures 
were similar to each other in many respects, the methodology for qs was 
the most straightforward.105 The numerator of qs included common 
stock, preferred stock, short-term debt, and long-term debt.106 Common 
 
 98. Id. at 70. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. As of early 2019, Chung and Pruitt’s article was the most cited of the approximately 
30,000 articles mentioning Tobin’s q generated by a search of “Tobin’s q” on Google Scholar, with 
more than 2,500 citations. 
 102. See Stephen B. Perfect & Kenneth W. Wiles, Alternative Constructions of Tobin’s q: An 
Empirical Comparison, 1 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 313 (1994). 
 103. Id. at 314. They noted that q had become an increasingly popular measure of firm 
performance in academic research because it provided an estimate of the value of a firm’s 
intangible assets, including monopoly power, goodwill, high quality managers, and growth 
opportunities. Id. at 313–14. Perfect and Wiles did not determine that those techniques actually 
resulted in estimates that reflected market values; instead, they were simply comparing five 
different approaches. See id. at 314 (“We do not, however, determine which estimator most closely 
approximates the firm’s true value.”).  
 104. Id. at 315. 
 105. See id. at 315–16, 335 (describing the procedures used to estimate q ratios for each of the 
sample firms and noting that qs “is relatively simple to construct”). All of the other measures used 
market prices for common stock and various estimating techniques for the market value of 
preferred stock and debt. See id. at 317–24. Some of the estimating techniques were quite 
complicated: for example, calculating estimates of the market value of debt involved both estimates 
of changes in yields and a recursive methodology to calculate the maturity structure of a firm’s 
debt. See id. at 317–18.  
 106. See id. at 315–16 (presenting and explaining the variables represented in the equation 
for qs). 
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stock was based on year-end prices, preferred stock was estimated, and 
debt was based on book values.107 The denominator of qs was simply the 
book value of a firm’s assets.108 
Perfect and Wiles conceded that the assumptions associated 
with qs introduced inevitable and problematic aspects of measurement 
error.109 Speaking of the denominator, for instance, they noted, “While 
these data are easily obtainable, they do not reflect the effects of 
inflation or technological innovation.”110 Their concerns were consistent 
with emerging research in the macroeconomics literature that had been 
grappling expressly with the estimation errors created by using an 
inaccurate measure of Tobin’s q. For example, some empirical studies 
in the “Macro q” literature warned that the relationship between 
Tobin’s q and investment behavior was weak or insignificant,111 which 
led macroeconomists to confront the possibility that these null results 
were a product of measurement error in Tobin’s q.112 
 
 107. In each of the five models, the value of preferred stock was estimated, because of its 
infrequency of trading. Id. at 316–17. The estimation techniques involved both using reported 
prices in Compustat and capitalizing the total preferred dividends based on the Standard and 
Poor’s preferred stock yield index; these two techniques arrived at comparable estimates. See id. 
at 317–18 (explaining the differences between the two approaches and presenting descriptive 
statistics for the preferred stocks used). 
 108. See id. at 315–16 (listing SRC, “the firm’s year-end book value of total assets,” as the 
denominator of the qs equation).  
 109. See id. at 329, 338 (recognizing that using the book value of a firm’s total assets to 
estimate replacement costs can lead to underestimating replacement costs).  
 110. Id.  
 111. See, e.g., Andrew B. Abel & Olivier J. Blanchard, The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical 
Movements in Investment, 54 ECONOMETRICA 249, 249–50 (1986) (noting that empirical studies 
regressing investment on q show that q fails to explain variations in investment); Richard 
Blundell, Stephen Bond, Michael Devereux & Fabio Schiantarelli, Investment and Tobin’s Q: 
Evidence from Company Panel Data, 51 J. ECONOMETRICS 233, 247, 251–52 (1992) (analyzing a 
number of different estimations of q and finding that strong assumptions were required to derive 
a relationship between investment and average q); Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett & Glenn 
R. Hubbard, A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms As Natural 
Experiments, 1994 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 4, 53–54 (arguing that q explains 
investment poorly); Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Evidence on q and Investment for Japanese 
Firms, 4 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 371, 388–90 (1990) (performing an empirical analysis of 
Tobin’s q and finding that the relationship between investment and q is not stable and did not 
accurately explain Japanese investment during the economic boom from 1983–88).  
 112. See Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, Measurement Error and the Relationship 
Between Investment and q, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1027 (2000) [hereinafter Erickson & Whited, 
Measurement] (examining whether the failure of q to predict investment in empirical research is 
due to error in measuring Tobin’s q); see also Timothy Erickson & Toni W. Whited, Treating 
Measurement Error in Tobin’s q, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1286 (2012) [hereinafter Erickson & Whited, 
Treating] (examining estimators that help remedy measurement error in q). Much of the careful 
analysis of measurement error in Tobin’s q has been in the macroeconomic context, which as we 
have noted uses Tobin’s q as an independent variable to explain corporate investment rather than 
as a dependent variable. It is well known that measurement error in an independent variable can 
result in biased regression estimates, which no doubt helps explain the focus on measurement 
error in the Macro q context. Interestingly, this analysis does not seem to have migrated to the 
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The greater sensitivity to measurement error in the 
macroeconomic literature was also due in part to the econometric 
challenges associated with using Tobin’s q as an independent variable 
associated with investment behavior, as had been typical in that 
literature.113 These concerns regarding measurement error in proxies 
for q also led the macroeconomics literature to focus  on the problems 
that Perfect and Wiles raised regarding estimates of intangible 
assets.114  
One might imagine that finance scholars, like macroeconomics 
scholars, would see Perfect and Wiles’s findings as a warning, a yellow 
light for market-to-book estimates of q, if not a red one. Perfect and 
Wiles certainly saw their findings as cautionary, and anyone who read 
the first sentence of their abstract was warned: “Although Tobin’s q is 
an attractive theoretical firm performance measure, its empirical 
construction is subject to considerable measurement error.”115 The 
abstract further put a reader on notice that market-to-book estimates 
of q were especially problematic: “The simple-to-construct estimator 
produces empirical results that differ significantly from the alternative 
estimators.”116 Readers who made it past the abstract would receive, 
page after page, the unmistakable message that if they chose to use a 
market-to-book estimate for q, they would do so at their peril. 
Yet finance scholars cited Perfect and Wiles, not as a source of 
concern, but as a justification for using a simplistic version of Tobin’s 
 
empirical corporate finance literature, though as we explain below the potential bias from 
measurement error in Tobin’s q is seriously problematic even when Tobin’s q is used as an outcome 
variable. 
 113. See Erickson & Whited, Measurement, supra note 112, at 1030:  
Mismeasurement of marginal q can generate all the pathologies afflicting empirical 
q models. In the classical errors-in-variables model, for example, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) R2 is a downward-biased estimate of the true model’s coefficient of 
determination, and the OLS coefficient estimate for the mismeasured regressor is 
biased toward zero. Irrelevant variables may appear significant since coefficient 
estimates for perfectly measured regressors can be biased away from zero. This bias 
can differ greatly between two subsamples, even if the rate of measurement error is the 
same in both.  
 114. For example, writing in the “Macro q” tradition, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have 
developed an alternative estimate for Tobin’s q called “Total q” that includes in its denominator 
an estimate of the replacement cost of a firm’s intangible assets, along with the book value of a 
firm’s property, plant, and equipment. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 256 (describing the 
calculation method for Total q); infra notes 174–176 (same); see also  Peters and Taylor Total Q, 
WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS. (July 19, 2016), http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/included/ 
luke-taylors-total-q/ [https://perma.cc/NB43-PUHE] (presenting a Total q dataset).   
 115. Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 313. 
 116. Id.  
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q.117 In an extraordinary reinterpretation, Perfect and Wiles became a 
green light for market-to-book estimates, including Simple q. 
One reason researchers were sanguine about  a market-to-book 
estimate of q was its appearance on the left side of regressions, rather 
than the right side. In contrast to the macroeconomists’ use of Tobin’s q 
as an independent variable, where measurement error was known to be 
likely to create biased regression estimates, the financial economists’ 
use of Tobin’s q as a dependent variable (e.g., in the estimation of 
whether governance provisions were associated with firm value) did not 
generate similar concerns. Instead, the assumption was that 
measurement error in Tobin’s q as an outcome variable should not bias 
any coefficients in the regression so long as the measurement error is 
random (although it might cause standard errors to be larger than they 
would be in the absence of measurement error). In a separate paper, we 
show that this assumption is correct for the mismeasurement of the 
numerator of Tobin’s q, but is wrong when mismeasurement affects the 
denominator.118 
For scholars using Tobin’s q as an outcome variable, the 
assumption that random measurement error in q only affected a 
regression model’s standard errors made a simple market-to-book 
estimate seem even more attractive. In particular, the use of simplified 
versions of Tobin’s q appeared to be a conservative means to avoid Type 
I error (i.e., false positives) in estimating the determinants of firm 
value. If scholars found a result when using a market-to-book estimate 
such as Simple q, this argument went, the finding was both unbiased 
and unlikely to be the result of chance.  
For example, in studying the relationship between incorporation 
in Delaware and firm value, Robert Daines used a market-to-book 
version of Tobin’s q and made this very point for justifying its use: 
“While more complex estimates of Tobin’s Q are possible, this simple 
measure produces coefficient estimates whose signs are unbiased and 
conservative in that they are less likely to produce significant results 
(Perfect and Wiles, 1994).”119 In this fashion, the problems associated 
 
 117. See Daines, supra note 2, at 531 (citing Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 339); Kaplan 
& Zingales, supra note 69, at 177 n.4 (citing Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, generally for the 
conclusion that improvements to Simple q obtained by using alternative measures were fairly 
limited); see also Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of 
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1052, 1067 (2010) (noting that, in 
estimating Tobin’s q, they use the method employed in Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69). 
 118. See Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.  
 119. Daines, supra note 2, at 531; see also Gompers et al., supra note 117, at 1068 (noting that 
measurement error in the book value denominator of their estimate of q “does inflate the residuals 
and standard errors, making inference more difficult” but that “measurement error in the 
dependent variable does not cause bias”). 
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with simple market-to-book estimates of Tobin’s q documented by 
Perfect and Wiles had been transformed into a feature rather than a 
bug. Unfortunately, this sanguine conclusion does not hold when the 
dependent variable is a ratio such as Simple q, where the denominator 
is measured with error, as we discuss below and in the Appendix.120 
Following the publication of Chung and Pruitt and Perfect and 
Wiles, scholars continued to use a simplified market-to-book estimate 
for Tobin’s q, occasionally making refinements to its precise 
calculation.121 Surprisingly, they often cited Perfect and Wiles as 
support for continuing to rely on a simplified market-to-book estimate 
for Tobin’s q, even though the gist of Perfect and Wiles was that qs had 
serious methodological flaws.     
Especially notable in this regard was Steven Kaplan and Luigi 
Zingales’s 1997 article, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide 
Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? Published in the prestigious 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, the study sits squarely in the “Macro 
q” literature in that it investigated and questioned previous findings 
regarding the investment–cash flow sensitivities of firms.122 These 
previous findings were based on a version of Tobin’s q derived from 
estimates of replacement costs, following Brainard and Tobin’s original 
formulation.  
Yet Kaplan and Zingales instead used a simplified version of 
Tobin’s q, grounding it in the market-to-book ratio examined in Perfect 
and Wiles’s study. The precise definition, which would shape the course 
of corporate governance research for the next two decades, was as 
follows: 
𝑞 = 𝐴𝑇 + 𝑀𝑉𝐸 − 𝐵𝑉𝐸 − 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑇  
where AT is the book value of assets, MVE is the market value of 
common stock, BVE is the book value of common equity, and DT are 
balance sheet deferred taxes.123 They justified their choice in a footnote, 
noting that: “[Fazarri, Hubbard, and Peterson] compute Q based on 
replacement costs, while we simply use a market-to-book ratio. The 
results in Perfect and Wiles [1994] indicate that the improvements 
obtained from the more involved computation of Q are fairly limited, 
 
 120. See also Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.  
 121. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126; Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 170, 211–
12. 
 122. See Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 170, 211–12. The findings examined by Kaplan 
and Zingales were originally published in Fazzari, Hubbard & Peterson, supra note 58. 
 123. See Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 177.  
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particularly when regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects.”124 
This formulation is the one we label Simple q.125 
Note that the 1997 formulation by Kaplan and Zingales appears 
to be consistent with Macro q because the denominator seems focused 
on the value of assets and the left side of the balance sheet. In fact, 
however, this formulation is equivalent to a simplistic version of Tobin’s 
q in which the numerator and denominator are both derived on the right 
side of the balance sheet. The reason stems from the fundamental 
equation of accounting, which is that assets equal liabilities plus equity. 
Specifically, AT = BVE + BVD, where BVD is the book value of debt, 
defined as all liabilities. Given this equality, simple algebra yields the 
following equivalent equation for Tobin’s q: 
𝑞 = 𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷 − 𝐷𝑇𝐵𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷  
The above equation is based exclusively on measures of a firm’s 
outstanding securities: market value of equity and book values of equity 
and debt. Some formulations of the above version of Simple q do not 
include DT, balance sheet deferred taxes, and others add preferred 
securities in addition to debt, but this formulation is analytically the 
same. The key point here is that Simple q is not based on the market 
value of assets divided by their replacement costs, but instead is based 
on a simplified version of the market value of firm’s securities divided 
by their book value. 
Another historical strand in our story of Tobin’s q merits 
exploration. While financial economists were adopting Simple q, 
accounting academics were carefully studying the econometric 
challenges that arose from “scale differences” in regressions when the 
main dependent variable was the market value of firms’ capital. This 
accounting literature was not specifically focused on Tobin’s q, but 
rather considered the more general question of how to account properly 
for the fact that firms vary in size. Just as one should not reach 
conclusions about crime rates simply by comparing the number of 
murders in New York to those in, say, Lawrence, Kansas, one should 
adjust for the size of firms in any econometric tests with the market 
value of firms’ capital as the dependent variable. Simple q was, in a 
 
 124. Id. at 177 n.4. 
 125. As discussed below, academic studies occasionally use this calculation of Tobin’s q but do 
not deduct deferred taxes from the numerator. See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text 
(citing several representative examples of Simple q calculations from recent academic literature). 
Given the modest effect of deferred taxes on the overall calculation of Simple q, we include these 
studies as among those that use Simple q.  
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way, a crude attempt to make such adjustments, by scaling the market 
value of firms’ capital by their book value. But the accounting literature 
undertook a more comprehensive and nuanced approach. 
Specifically, one year before the publication of Kaplan and 
Zingales’s paper, Mary Barth and Sanjay Kallapur published an 
important study of the effects of the bias that resulted from scale 
differences in regressions using the market values of firms’ equity as a 
dependent variable.126 Barth and Kallapur did not limit their analysis 
to the use of book value as a potential scaling factor in the way that the 
finance literature did with market-to-book estimates of q; in fact, their 
article did not even mention Tobin’s q. Instead, their focus was on how, 
generally, regressions with the market value of firms’ equity as the 
dependent variable should take into account differences in scale.127       
During the following two decades, the accounting literature has 
continued to develop and refine this general approach to scale 
adjustments.128 Interestingly, the concept of Tobin’s q does not appear 
to have arisen in this literature, perhaps because accounting scholars 
were not part of the historical devolution of Tobin’s q into Simple q and 
accordingly did not consider whether one might study Tobin’s q as a 
dependent variable instead of studying market values directly (and 
then addressing challenges related to scale adjustments). The 
accounting literature implicitly rejected, or at least ignored, Tobin’s q 
as a method of scaling the market value of firms’ capital and instead 
studied other, less problematic approaches. 
Apparently, neither corporate law scholars nor empirical finance 
scholars noticed these developments in the accounting literature. 
Instead of considering the accounting literature’s new empirical 
techniques, during the two decades after the publication of Kaplan and 
Zingales’s study, law and finance scholars have simply used Simple q. 
Indeed, the use of Simple q in corporate governance scholarship became 
de rigueur after the publication of Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew 
Metrick’s widely cited 2003 article in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, entitled Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Notably, 
 
 126. See Barth & Kallapur, supra note 25 (concluding that “the most effective remedy” for 
scale differences “is to include a scale proxy as an independent variable and report inferences based 
on White standard errors”). 
 127. See id. at 528 (“We seek to provide evidence on the extent of scale-related econometric 
problems in accounting research contexts and the effectiveness of available remedies.”).  
 128. See, e.g., Barth & Clinch, supra note 25, at 253–54 (assessing simulations of the effects of 
firm size in regressions based on market values); Ohlson & Kim, supra note 25, at 398–99 
(discussing modifications of market-value-based regressions to account for scale). 
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Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s sole source of authority for using Simple 
q was Kaplan and Zingales’s 1997 paper.129  
During recent years, articles in which Simple q is the dependent 
variable have continued to appear in the academic literature. We 
conclude this Part with a few representative examples. For instance, 
Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman, and Venky Nagar begin 
their definitions discussion with the following straightforward 
paragraph: “Our measure of firm value is Tobin’s Q (Q). We define Q as 
the ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets, both computed at the end of each fiscal year.”130 Their precise 
calculation of Tobin’s q tracks the version used by Kaplan and Zingales, 
based on market and book values of securities, except that their 
numerator does not include a deduction for balance sheet deferred 
taxes. Likewise, Martijn Cremers and Allen Ferrell write in a footnote: 
“We interpret a higher average Q, measured as the ratio of book value 
of firm assets to market capitalization, as evidence that the firm uses 
its resources more productively and efficiently, in line with the 
literature.”131 Merritt Fox, Ronald Gilson, and Darius Palia call Simple 
q “the typical measure of a firm’s success at creating value.”132 In 
adopting this definition, they include a footnote discussing the potential 
problems that its use creates; nevertheless, they conclude: “Tobin’s Q is 
still, however, a reasonable way of looking for a historical period of time 
to see which firms on average did better at creating value and which 
did worse.”133 As these statements suggest, many of the most important 
recent questions in corporate law have been addressed by studies that 
rely on Simple q. 
That brings our story up to date. Today, Simple q has become 
the accepted and central dependent variable in corporate law and 
 
 129. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126 (citing Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, as the 
basis for using Simple q). 
 130. Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman & Venky Nagar, Exit as Governance: An 
Empirical Analysis, 68 J. FIN. 2515, 2524 (2013); see also id. at app. (defining Q).  
 131. Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69 
J. FIN. 1167, 1168 n.2 (2014). Cremers and Ferrell calculate q using the formula set forth in Kaplan 
and Zingales, supra note 69, at 177. See Cremers & Ferrell, supra, at 1173 n.9 (describing their 
formula for calculating q). One additional data question is whether the market price of a firm’s 
stock is determined as of the end of a firm’s fiscal year or the end of the calendar year. 
 132. Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson & Darius Palia, Corporate Governance Changes as a 
Signal: Contextualizing the Performance Link 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working 
Paper No. 323 & Stanford Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 496, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2807926 [https://perma.cc/T7R4-UYKS]. 
Similar to Bharath, Jayaraman & Nagar, supra note 130, Fox, Gilson, and Palia define Tobin’s q 
using the same formula as Kaplan and Zingales, supra note 69, but omit any deduction in the 
numerator for deferred taxes. See Fox et al., supra, at 10 n.24 (describing the method used to 
calculate Tobin’s q).  
 133. Fox et al., supra note 132, at 11 n.25.  
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related scholarship. Notwithstanding some criticism,134 it has become 
standard practice for scholars to assert, without further explanation, 
not only that Simple q is an acceptable measure of Tobin’s q but also 
that it is an appropriate measure of firm value.135  
II. THE CASE AGAINST USING SIMPLE Q  
For some readers, the peculiar intellectual journey of Tobin’s q 
will be reason enough to question its reliability as a proxy for firm value 
in the literature. But we also want to present a more specific case 
against using any version of Tobin’s q—and particularly Simple q—as 
such a proxy.  
First, we pause to ask whether it makes theoretical sense to 
assume that Tobin’s q, in any formulation, measures the value of 
corporations. Our basic answer is no. The problem is that a high value 
of Tobin’s q does not necessarily mean that a corporation is more 
valuable in any meaningful way. 
Second, we focus on the problem of measurement error with 
respect to Simple q. Although the literature frequently ignores the 
measurement error problems associated with using simple market-to-
book estimates for Tobin’s q, many of the problems have been 
scrutinized in the macroeconomics literature. We explore why 
measurement errors are likely to create biased estimates in regressions 
with Simple q as a dependent variable. 
Third, we examine recent advances in the asset pricing 
literature that raise questions about the very meaning of Simple q. 
Specifically, the book-to-market ratio (similar to the reciprocal of 
Simple q, except that it is calculated as a firm’s book value divided by 
the market value of equity, instead of the full capital structure) has 
been a risk factor in prominent asset pricing models. As we illustrate 
below, firms that have a high level of Simple q (and therefore typically 
a low book-to-market ratio) are likely to experience relatively low future 
 
 134. See, e.g., Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong & José A. Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes: 
Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms, 70 J. FIN. 839, 870 (2015) (citing the “substantial 
empirical debate about whether traditional measures such as market-to-book or Tobin’s q 
adequately capture growth options”). 
 135. See, e.g., Ran Duchin, Amir Goldberg & Denis Sosyura, Spillovers Inside Conglomerates: 
Incentives and Capital, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1696 (2017) (using Simple q to assess the impact of pay 
changes within divisions of firms); T. Clifton Green & Russell Jame, Company Name Fluency, 
Investor Recognition, and Firm Value, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 813 (2013) (concluding that “firms with 
more fluent names have significantly higher Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratios”); Byoung-Hyoun 
Hwang & Hugh Hoikwang Kim, It Pays to Write Well, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 373 (2017) (using Simple 
q to conclude that easier-to-read disclosure documents are associated with higher firm valuation); 
Antoinette Schoar & Luo Zuo, Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO 
Careers and Management Styles, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1425 (2017) (using Simple q to assess CEOs). 
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returns, and vice versa. This finding suggests that scholars should be 
more careful in reaching conclusions about firms with higher measures 
of Simple q.  
To be clear, our claim here is not that Tobin’s q can never be an 
acceptable proxy for firm value. Rather, our goal is to establish why 
scholars who make assertions about the value of corporations based on 
a positive relationship between Simple q and a variable of interest bear 
a heavy burden of persuasion, a burden we believe they have not met. 
A. Interpretive Error 
First, it is worth taking a moment to ask what the original 
formulation of Tobin’s q measures. According to Tobin, when q is high, 
the market value of an asset—call it a widget—held by a firm is greater 
than its replacement cost. In other words, the perception among market 
participants is that this asset is more valuable than the cost of replacing 
it. If this perception is accurate, and a firm can increase the scale of its 
operations, it follows that the firm should invest in widgets, and 
continue to invest, until the market value of widgets is equal to their 
replacement cost—that is, until q is equal to one. 
However, it does not follow from this analysis that firms with 
relatively high Tobin’s q have relatively high value or that they will 
even retain a high level of Tobin’s q. To the contrary, according to the 
original macroeconomic theory, the Tobin’s q of any given firm should 
revert to one in the future.136 Additionally, to the extent the market 
value of a firm’s assets is greater than their replacement value, high 
Tobin’s q firms could face declining profit opportunities. (Widgets might 
become more expensive due to increased demand, or competitors might 
recognize the profit opportunities associated with widgets.) 
Alternatively, under the q theory of investment, Tobin’s q might exceed 
one for a sustained period of time because of high adjustment costs. 
Indeed, these adjustment costs could vary systematically with the type 
of assets owned by a firm. For instance, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor 
find that intangible assets have convex adjustment costs that are 
roughly twice as high as those for physical assets, suggesting that firms 
 
 136. Moreover, the disconnect between the market value of a firm’s assets and their 
replacement value might be due to short-term market opportunities or to behavioral effects on 
market prices. High q can also be consistent with lower expected returns (i.e., a lower cost of 
capital). We explore the relationship between q and equity returns in Section II.C.  
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with large amounts of intangible assets may take longer to respond to 
investment opportunities implied by a high Tobin’s q.137 
In theory, a high Tobin’s q firm could even reflect poor 
management. Indeed, as Philip Dybvig and Mitch Warachka note, a 
high Tobin’s q could result from inefficient underinvestment (and 
accordingly a failure to maximize firm value) given that additional 
investment should drive q towards one.138 Dybvig and Warachka’s 
critique of Tobin’s q is more narrowly circumscribed than ours: they 
focus on developing a theoretical critique of Tobin’s q and assessing 
measures of operating efficiency as a potential substitute.139 
Nevertheless, it is striking that Dybvig and Warachka’s paper has not 
only remained unpublished since it was posted online in 2010, but also 
has been mostly ignored within the law and finance literature.140 
 
 137. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 253. As Peters and Taylor note, one possible 
explanation for the higher adjustment costs associated with intangible assets could reflect the fact 
that adjusting intangible capital often requires replacing specialized employees. Id. 
 138. See Philip H. Dybvig & Mitch Warachka, Tobin’s q Does Not Measure Firm Performance: 
Theory, Empirics, and Alternatives (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562444 [https://perma.cc/QT7T-DBDR] (performing an empirical 
analysis demonstrating that Tobin’s q is not a proxy for firm performance). As a simple example, 
Dybvig and Warachka posit a firm with a market value of $15 based on $10 of investment, yielding 
a q of 1.5. See id. at 2. If expanding the firm’s scale through a $20 investment increased its market 
value by $24, the firm’s q would decline to 1.3 but its market value would increase by $4. Id.  
 139. See id. at 2–3 (deriving a theoretical framework to demonstrate the conflicting 
implications of better performance on Tobin’s q and developing two new operating efficiency 
measures focusing on scale efficiency and cost discipline). 
 140. For instance, while nearly 400 papers discuss Tobin’s q within Westlaw, see supra note 
9, only four papers within Westlaw could be located that cite Dybvig and Warachka’s paper. To 
determine these figures, we conducted a search in the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals” 
database for “Dybvig /4 Warachka.” Dybvig and Warachka’s paper was cited twice in 2018 in 
conjunction with an unpublished version of this paper to point out that there are critiques of 
Tobin’s q. See Amihud et al., supra note 3, at 1483 n.24 (citing Dybvig and Warachka as “a critique 
of the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value”); Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
852, 895 n.115 (“Tobin’s Q has, in any event, been seriously questioned as a means of measuring 
the effect of corporate governance changes on firm performance in both the financial and legal 
literature.”). But of the two papers before 2018, one paper dismisses the study in a footnote as “an 
unpublished paper,” see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1102 n.53 (2015), and the other cites it once for 
the proposition that the use of q as a measure of company performance “has been subject to 
criticism,” see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 462 n.39 (2014). 
In addition, we are aware of one paper within the corporate governance literature that also cites 
Dybvig and Warachka. See Klausner, supra note 9, at 18 (citing Dybvig and Warachka for the 
proposition that q “is considered by some economists to be an unreliable measure of value”).  
Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:12 PM 
2020] THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q 389 
Finally, the theoretical interpretation of Tobin’s q as a measure 
of the value of corporations is misplaced for econometric reasons as well. 
The standard “q regression” generally takes the following form: 
 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑄  = 𝛽 +  𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖  
where 𝛽   is an estimated intercept, X represents a regressor of interest, 𝛽  represents the regression coefficient that estimates the association 
of the regressor with Simple q, and 𝜖  is the error term. (A typical q 
regression also includes a vector of control variables, which we omit 
without loss of generality.) Now consider the two primary statistical 
justifications for using a ratio such as Tobin’s q as an outcome variable 
of interest.141  
In the first instance, the variable of interest is a specific measure 
such as firm value, but a researcher may be concerned about scale 
effects, as has been studied in the accounting literature.142 As is well 
known within statistics,143 the researcher could control for scale effects 
by dividing every variable in the regression equation (i.e., both left-side 
and right-side variables, including the intercept) by a scaling factor. In 
the context of estimating the market value of a firm, for instance, a 
researcher would divide every variable by a scale factor such as book 
value, thus resulting in Simple q as the outcome variable. However, we 
are unaware of a single paper in empirical corporate finance that 
justifies its reliance on either Tobin’s q or Simple q in this fashion or 
that divides every variable in the regression equation by the scaling 
factor. Rather, researchers uniformly apply the specification noted 
above, which omits estimating a coefficient for the ratio 1/(Book Value) 
and typically includes only nonratio regressors (i.e., X is not divided by 
book value).144 
In the second instance, the variable of interest to the researcher 
is supposed to be the ratio itself, which is believed to be of independent 
 
 141. See Robert Wiseman, On the Use and Misuse of Ratios in Strategic Management Research, 
in 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT 75 (Donald D. Bergh & David J. 
Ketchen eds., 2009). Wiseman notes that there are three rationales for using a ratio as an outcome 
variable: deflating a variable of interest to be a rate, deflating a variable of interest to be a 
proportion, and examining a ratio that is of independent theoretical interest. Id. at 76–80. Given 
that the first two rationales reflect the same concern about scale effects, this leaves two principle 
reasons researchers utilize ratios as outcome variables.  
 142. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text (discussing the accounting literature’s 
focus on accounting for differences in scale amongst firms when examining the predictors of a 
firm’s market value of equity).  
 143. See Richard Kronmal, Spurious Correlation and the Fallacy of the Ratio Standard 
Revisited, 156 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 379, 381 (1993) (outlining the process of controlling for a 
deflator: dividing both the dependent and independent variables by a common factor). 
 144. We discuss these challenges in greater detail in Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.  
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theoretical interest (e.g., Tobin’s q is purported to be a proxy for 
monopoly power, firm performance, or some other construct). The 
researcher therefore chooses to estimate the relationship between a 
particular predictor of interest and the ratio. In so doing, however, the 
researcher is effectively examining whether the effect of the predictor 
on the numerator of the ratio is moderated by the ratio’s denominator. 
Imagine, for instance, a researcher who seeks to examine the effect of a 
staggered board on Simple q using the specification noted in the 
equation above. In such a scenario, the regression will estimate the 
effect on Simple q’s numerator (an estimate of the market value of the 
firm) from the interaction of the staggered board variable and the 
denominator of Simple q (the book value of assets). The reasons arise 
from basic principles of linear regression, yet this interpretative 
challenge, as well as other assumptions this estimation approach 
entails, are not even mentioned in papers that use some version of 
Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.145  
B. Measurement Error in Simple Q 
We now turn to some aspects of measurement error that are 
problematic for studies that rely on Simple q to assess the relationship 
between corporate law and the value of corporations. We begin this 
critique by revisiting the Perfect and Wiles study of five different 
formulations of Tobin’s q. Recall that scholars have cited Perfect and 
Wiles as justifying the use of market-to-book estimates of q, such as 
Simple q. That reliance on Perfect and Wiles has been based on two 
generally unstated assumptions: that alternative measures of Tobin’s q 
would not significantly improve measurement accuracy and that the 
measurement errors associated with market-to-book estimates are not 
problematic. As we demonstrate, both of these assumptions are 
incorrect. 
1. Evidence of Measurement Error 
As we note above, Perfect and Wiles compared a market-to-book 
estimate of q, labeled qs, to four other estimates of Tobin’s q. They 
calculated these four other estimates using more detailed techniques 
than simply dividing the market value of a firm by its book value, 
including more accurate estimates of replacement value that capture 
changes in prices, depreciation, and technology, as well as first-in, first-
 
 145. See id. 
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out (“FIFO”) versus last-in, first-out (“LIFO”) inventory methods.146 For 
instance, some of these other estimates of Tobin’s q took advantage of a 
Securities and Exchange Commission requirement, effective from 
1976–1979, that large firms report annual estimates of the replacement 
costs of plant, equipment, and inventories, as well as depreciation and 
cost of goods sold, and a similar requirement, effective from 1980–1985, 
arising from Financial Accounting Standard No. 33.147  
Perfect and Wiles found that although their estimates of Tobin’s 
q generally were highly correlated with one another,148 the estimate for 
qs had a significantly larger mean and median, and generated 
significantly different values for particular firms than estimates for the 
other four.149 For example, they tested how similar the five Tobin’s q 
estimates were in grouping a sample of 558 firms into two categories: 
Tobin’s q greater than one versus Tobin’s q less than one.150 The simple 
estimate of qs agreed with the other estimates in only 79.4 percent to 
82.8 percent of cases.151 In other words, for roughly one in five firms, 
the simple estimate of qs was not even precise enough to correspond 
with other measures in categorizing a firm’s q as above or below one. 
Perfect and Wiles concluded: “Thus, although qs is relatively simple to 
construct, it does not produce sorting results that are comparable to the 
other four estimators.”152 To repeat, Perfect and Wiles concluded that a 
market-to-book estimate of Tobin’s q did not produce comparable 
results to four alternative formulations of Tobin’s q. That is not the 
ringing endorsement of their market-to-book estimate that many 
scholars have assumed.  
The literature’s citation to Perfect and Wiles as justifying the 
use of  market-to-book estimates of q is all the more puzzling in light of 
additional studies documenting that, of all the estimates of Tobin’s q, 
market-to-book estimates perform among the worst. In their 
comprehensive empirical estimation of measurement error in Tobin’s q, 
Timothy Erickson and Toni Whited note that different approaches to 
 
 146. See Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 324–32 (detailing the derivation of the different 
proxies for q). 
 147. See id. at 326 (discussing the rationale for choosing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board standards as estimates of asset 
replacement cost). Interestingly, firms generally included disclaimers along with these reported 
estimates, indicating that the managers believed the replacement value data were “of limited value 
because of the subjective judgments necessarily involved in making these estimates.” Id. at 326 
n.13.  
 148. Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for the measures ranged from 0.9045 to 0.9856. 
Id. at 334. Correlations among changes in q were lower, in the range of 0.8503 to 0.9404. Id. 
 149. See id. at 332–34 (describing the various q ratio estimates). 
 150. Id. at 335 tbl.7. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 335. 
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calculating Tobin’s q yield nearly two hundred different estimates of 
“Macro q” and two hundred different estimates of “Finance q.”153 (Recall 
that macroeconomists have been using a version of Tobin’s q that more 
closely resembles Brainard and Tobin’s original conception, whereas 
financial economists have adapted Tobin’s q in ways that make it easier 
to calculate.) 
In a series of studies, Erickson and Whited have demonstrated 
several serious drawbacks to a market-to-book estimate, including 
biases that result from measurement error. Following Hayashi and 
Inoue, they question whether the basic assumption of perfect 
substitutability holds for such a simplified estimate of q, which 
aggregates all of a firm’s assets.154  
Erickson and Whited do not mince words: they find that “the 
most common proxy used in the finance literature, the market to book 
ratio, only explains about forty percent of the variation in average q.”155 
They conclude that  the ratio’s “measurement error problem must 
therefore stem more from issues such as aggregation and unobservable 
assets.”156 Later studies have confirmed Erickson and Whited’s 
findings; for example, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor similarly find 
that “market-to-book-assets ratios are especially poor proxies” for the 
true theoretical Tobin’s q.157  
These problems with market-to-book proxies are also evidenced 
by the extent to which datasets including market-to-book ratios have 
extreme outliers, both high and low. Although scholars commonly 
exclude these outliers, even a cursory review of them suggests a number 
of puzzling findings. For example, in his study of Delaware law and firm 
value, Robert Daines eliminated the top and bottom one percent of firm-
level measurements of a market-to-book estimate of Tobin’s q, claiming 
that the effect of Delaware corporate law was unlikely to explain high 
or low Tobin’s q values.158  
However, using Simple q to estimate q, Guhan Subramanian 
found that the one percent lower and upper ranges in a sample of firms 
resembling Daine’s were 0.38 and 70.49, respectively, for the relevant 
periods.159 Such levels of Tobin’s q are extreme: it would be interesting 
 
 153. See Erickson & Whited, supra note 80, at 12. 
 154. See Erickson & Whited, Treating, supra note 112, at 1325. 
 155. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, On the Information Content of Different Measures 
of Q 22 (August 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
 156. Id. at 23.  
 157. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 252 (referencing similar findings to Erickson and 
Whited). 
 158. See Daines, supra note 2, at 530.  
 159. See Subramanian, supra note 2, at 39. 
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to know why a firm with a Tobin’s q of 0.38 had not been liquidated, or 
why a firm with a Tobin’s q of 70.49 had such a measure (and what it 
meant), perhaps because it was small or idiosyncratic in some way. 
Subramanian’s analysis suggests that the distribution of Simple q 
includes a significant number of extreme, outlier values, particularly in 
samples that include small firms. (As Subramanian notes, Enron’s 
Simple q at the height of its stock market valuation was 6.8.160) 
Unfortunately, the literature generally does not focus on the analysis 
or impact of Simple q outliers. 
Simple q generates such extreme outliers in part because of 
questionable assumptions with regard to both the numerator and the 
denominator utilized in estimating Simple q. With respect to the 
numerator, Simple q requires an estimate of the market value of a 
firm’s assets. However, Simple q seeks to estimate these values based 
on the market values of all of a firm’s outstanding securities, and these 
values are often not observable aside from a company’s outstanding 
common stock (assuming it is publicly traded). Market values for a 
firm’s other securities, such as outstanding debt and preferred stock, 
are instead typically estimated from book values, which can diverge 
from their fair value. As a result, the Simple q numerator is not based 
on an assessment of individual assets, or even categories of assets, on 
the left-hand side of the balance sheet; instead, it simply reflects the 
book values of capital on the right-hand side.  
More problematic still is the calculation of the denominator, 
which originally reflected the replacement value of a firm’s assets. 
Simple q substitutes basic accounting measures in its denominator. In 
particular, it uses a company’s book value of equity and debt as a proxy 
for the replacement value of assets. The use of book values virtually 
guarantees that the denominator will depart from the replacement cost 
of assets theorized by Tobin and Brainard. In a 1997 study examining 
measurement error in proxies for Tobin’s q, Wilbur Lewellen and S.G. 
Badrinath demonstrated that various conceptions of q differed 
significantly by using cases in which asset replacement costs, the 
original Tobin’s q denominator, were known.161 They found that revised 
q ratios based on actual replacement costs varied from book-value-
based estimates in the literature by ten percent to twenty percent.162 
The methodologies Lewellen and Badrinath used require considerable 
information, attention, and work, and they require data that are not 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Wilbur G. Lewellen & S.G. Badrinath, On the Measurement of Tobin’s q, 44 J. FIN. 
ECON. 77 (1997). 
 162. See id. at 121. 
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typically accessible to researchers. Obviously, it is much easier to 
calculate Simple q based on available Compustat data, and scholars 
have preferred the easier route. Measurement errors are an inevitable 
result. 
Book values have become especially subject to measurement 
error given the importance of intangible assets and financial 
engineering. Even assets as simple as a firm’s property, plant, and 
equipment (“PPE”) are recorded at historical cost less depreciation, 
which will vary depending on the depreciation schedule adopted by a 
firm and inevitably will diverge from market values. The value of 
inventory generally will reflect the lower of historical cost or fair value, 
and the inventory balance similarly will depend on whether sales of 
inventory are treated under FIFO or LIFO accounting. More complex 
assets are not part of book value at all. For example, unbooked 
intangible assets are increasingly important to firm value but are not 
reflected on balance sheets. Likewise, financial derivatives and 
unconsolidated subsidiaries can be important to the market value of a 
firm’s securities but are not included in book value.  
Given these measurement problems, Erickson and Whited’s 
finding that market-to-book measures of Tobin’s q perform poorly is not 
surprising. For the same reasons, Simple q inevitably is subject to 
significant measurement error due to the problems of asset aggregation 
and unobservability.  
2. Measurement Error and Bias  
In their study of Tobin’s q, Perfect and Wiles used each of the 
five estimates of Tobin’s q as an outcome variable and regressed each 
one on a variety of firm characteristics, much as empirical finance 
scholars do today in corporate governance research.163 Perfect and Wiles 
found that the regression coefficients for the simple version, qs, differed 
significantly from those obtained using other measures of q.164 Although 
scholars have subsequently cited Perfect and Wiles to support their use 
of Simple q insofar that it resembles qs, Perfect and Wiles warned that 
qs could lead to biased estimates: “In summary, the results indicate that 
using qs produces regression estimates that often differ from those 
found using the other four q ratio estimates, while qB, qLR, qPW, and qQH 
produce comparable regression estimates.”165 Their message was clear: 
beware of using Simple q as a dependent variable. 
 
 163. See Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 314. 
 164. See id. at 336. 
 165. Id. at 338. Perfect and Wiles suggested a more optimistic view of qs in one paragraph near 
the end of their article, though they also make it clear that there were limitations associated with 
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Notwithstanding these warnings, there might have been some 
reasons for scholars not to worry. The fact that Simple q is measured 
with error might pose only a minor inconvenience if classical 
measurement error assumptions held. Under the classical errors-in-
variables model, errors in the variable of interest are assumed to be 
independent of the true measure of the variable. To the extent this 
assumption holds, measurement errors in a dependent variable do not 
lead to biased estimates of regression coefficients; the only consequence 
of the presence of measurement errors in the dependent variable is that 
they inflate the standard errors of these coefficient estimates.166 As 
noted above, this approach to measurement error has led some scholars 
to view Simple q regressions as conservative because measurement 
error reduces the risk of Type I error (i.e., false positives).167 
The question remains, however, whether the assumptions of the 
classical errors-in-variables model hold. There are two technical 
reasons why they might not: problems with aggregation and problems 
with omitted variables. There is also one more general, fundamental, 
and unavoidable reason why the classical assumptions are unlikely to 
hold: Tobin’s q is a ratio. We discuss each of these issues in turn.  
First, the aggregation of assets can result in nonclassical 
measurement error. Consider, for instance, a simple firm that has only 
two types of assets: current assets and capital assets (i.e., property, 
plant and equipment). Under U.S. accounting rules, the book value of 
current assets is generally their fair value, meaning that the market 
value of current assets roughly equals their book value, so that the 
market-to-book ratio for current assets is typically close to one.  
In contrast, the book value of capital assets is their cost less 
depreciation. As a result, the market value of capital assets frequently 
 
this conclusion, which related to an additional estimation of the regression models using changes 
in q. See id. at 338–39. They cautioned that the similarity of the regression coefficients in such a 
specification was not surprising given that changes in common stock values should drive the 
changes in the q estimates, but concluded nevertheless that  
[i]f, however, changes in the q estimates are used, then the empirical results do not, in 
general, reveal significant differences among the estimators. An implication of this 
result is, of course, that qs, due to its ease of construction, may be an attractive 
estimator when changes in a firm’s q ratio are of interest. 
Id. at 339. 
 166. To illustrate, assume that we seek to understand whether x predicts y in a standard 
regression framework.  The true measure, 𝑦∗, is related to the regressor 𝑥  as 𝑦∗ = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝜖 . 
However, the outcome variable is measured with random error vi. Thus, 𝑦 = 𝑦∗ + 𝑣 , where vi 
represents random measurement error that is uncorrelated with 𝑦∗ and 𝑥 . Under these conditions, 
measurement error in the dependent variable does not lead to biased estimates of the regression 
coefficient 𝛽 , as can be seen by rewriting the model in 𝑦 : 𝑦 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝜖 + 𝑣 . Because both 𝜖  
and 𝑣  are assumed to be independent of 𝑥 , measurement error affects only the standard errors of 
the regression coefficient estimate, 𝛽 . 
 167. See discussion supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
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will differ from their book value, depending on whether the assets 
decline in value by more or less than their depreciation schedule. In 
some cases, the market-to-book ratio might be greater than one; in other 
cases it will be less than one.  
Moreover, the market might place a higher value on current 
assets than on capital assets, because current assets can be deployed 
more quickly. In short, there are any number of reasons why the 
expected market-to-book ratios for these two classes of assets might 
differ, regardless of how well a firm is managed. Moreover, firms are 
likely to differ systematically in the extent to which their assets are 
comprised of current assets. For these reasons, aggregating assets can 
cause Simple q to be biased in nonrandom ways, and failure to account 
for this fact might lead to biased estimates of the predictors of  
Simple q.  
In Appendix A, Table A.1, we show that this concern is not 
merely theoretical.168 We estimate the extent to which a firm’s level of 
current assets is associated with its measure of Simple q. We find that 
it is: a firm’s level of current assets is positively associated with a firm’s 
Simple q even after controlling for industry- and firm-fixed effects. In 
other words, the market attributes a higher Simple q-ratio to firms with 
larger amounts of current assets.   
The implications of this finding are troubling to the extent one 
is interested in understanding the determinants of Simple q. Because 
Simple q aggregates all assets (including current assets) it will be 
upwardly biased to the extent a firm has current assets. Moreover, the 
fact that this finding persists despite industry- and firm-fixed effects 
illustrates how this bias can vary within industries and firms. To the 
extent this variation is correlated with other firm characteristics, it can 
create biased estimates of the association of these characteristics with 
Simple q. A researcher might think they have spotted a relationship 
between some aspect of corporate law and firm value, but in fact the 
relationship between Simple q and the corporate law variable could be 
due, at least in part, to the correlation between the corporate law 
variable and a firm’s holding of current assets. 
Second, the omission of variables can result in nonclassical 
measurement error. Consider intangible assets. A firm’s expenditures 
to develop knowledge, intellectual property, or software are typically 
recorded on a company’s income statement as a research and 
development expense rather than capitalized on a company’s balance 
 
 168. See infra app. A, tbl. A.1. 
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sheet as an asset.169 In contrast, when a firm purchases an intangible 
asset, such as by acquiring another company or a patent, the firm 
generally capitalizes the asset on the balance sheet at the purchase 
price as part of a line entry for “Intangible Assets.”170 To the extent such 
intangibles are separately identifiable (e.g., particular patents, 
noncompetition agreements, etc.), they are separately recorded as 
“Other Intangible Assets,” with the residual balance of the purchase 
price being booked to “Goodwill,” which can be subsequently written 
down if these values are deemed “impaired” by management.   
In other words, two firms can have radically different book 
values based on the extent to which they “build” rather than “buy” their 
intangible assets, as well as the extent to which they reflect a 
manufacturing firm (where PPE is likely to be large) relative to a 
service firm (where PPE is likely to be small and intangibles more 
important). Moreover, these systematic accounting differences among 
service firms have become more important over time as the U.S. 
economy has shifted toward service- and technology-based industries, 
which has made intangible assets such as human capital, innovative 
products, brands, patents, software, customer relationships, databases, 
and distribution systems increasingly important.171 In their 2010 study, 
Carol Corrado and Charles Hulten estimate that intangible capital 
makes up thirty-four percent of firms’ total capital in recent years.172 
Simple q can be skewed upward given that it substitutes book 
value of capital for the replacement cost of assets, including intangible 
assets. Indeed, Simple q is by definition biased upward by research and 
development, brand management, and human capital, which are 
reflected in the market value of a firm’s capital, but not its book value. 
As Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny recognized: “Tobin’s Q is high when the 
firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to physical capital, such 
as monopoly power [Lindenberg and Ross (1981)], goodwill, a stock of 
patents, or good managers.”173 
The measurement error arising from the omission of intangibles 
also can lead to biased regression estimates. In Appendix A, Table A.2, 
we test this bias formally using an empirical estimate of a firm’s 
 
  169. When Do Intangible Assets Appear on the Balance Sheet?, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS (Oct. 8, 
2019), https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/when-do-intangible-assets-appear-on-the-
balance-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/FVF6-WPQ7] (“[I]f a company conducts expensive research 
for many years and eventually creates a valuable patent from this research, all of the associated 
cost is charged to expense as incurred - no intangible asset can be capitalized.”). 
 170.  Id.  
 171. See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological 
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99, 99 (2010). 
 172. See id. at 102 tbl.1. 
 173. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296. 
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intangible capital that Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have developed 
based on the firm’s prior expenditures on research and development 
plus prior selling, general, and administrative expenditures.174 With 
this estimate, Peters and Taylor calculated a modified version of Tobin’s 
q for all firms in the Compustat database from 1950 through 2015, 
which they refer to as Total q.175 Writing in the “Macro q” tradition, they 
find that Total q is associated with total investment (i.e., investment in 
both physical and intangible capital).176 
Importantly, the Peters and Taylor dataset includes their 
estimate of the replacement value of intangible capital that is not 
reflected on a firm’s balance sheet.177 Using these data, we estimate the 
extent to which the omission of intangible property from a firm’s 
reported book value of assets creates bias in Simple q. As with current 
assets, we find in Appendix A, Table A.2 that a firm’s level of intangible 
assets is positively associated with a firm’s Simple q even after 
controlling for industry- and firm-fixed effects.  
Put simply, the failure of book value to capture a firm’s 
investment in intangible property results in the systematic upward bias 
of Simple q for firms that make larger intangible property investments. 
This result has intuitive support: markets likely place some value on a 
firm’s intangible capital (thus increasing the numerator used in Simple 
q), yet Simple q fails to account for the replacement costs of these assets 
(thus biasing downward the denominator for Simple q). To provide a 
concrete example: in 2010, Microsoft had a Simple q of 3.27 but a Total 
 
 174. See infra app. A, tbl. A.2; see also Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 252:  
We interpret research and development (R&D) spending as an investment in knowledge 
capital, and we apply the perpetual-inventory method to a firm’s past R&D to measure 
the replacement cost of its knowledge capital. We similarly interpret a fraction of past 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) spending as an investment in organization 
capital, which includes human capital, brand, customer relationships, and distribution 
systems. 
 175. Formally, Peters and Taylor calculate Total q as the following: 
 𝑞 = 𝑉𝐾 + 𝐾  
where 𝑞  is their measure for Total q for each firm i as of the end of fiscal year t, 𝑉  is the market 
value of outstanding equity plus the book value of debt less the firm’s current assets in year t,  𝐾  
is the book value of the firm’s PPE in year t, and 𝐾  is their estimate for the replacement cost of 
the firm’s intangible capital in year t. Id. at 252. 
 176. See id. at 260 (“[T]otal q explains intangible investment slightly better than physical 
investment in our full sample, and it explains total investment even better.”). 
 177. See id. at 256–57 (explaining the methodology for measuring the replacement value of 
intangible assets). 
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q of 1.77, largely due to the fact that its book value of $86 billion did not 
reflect an estimated $54 billion of intangible assets.178 
As with current assets, the coefficient bias that arises because 
intangible assets are excluded from Simple q can affect the results of 
empirical studies. A researcher might think they have spotted a 
relationship between some aspect of corporate law and firm value, but 
in fact the relationship between Simple q and the corporate law variable 
could be due, at least in part, to the correlation between the corporate 
law variable and the level of a firm’s intangible assets. 
Finally, the fact that Simple q is a ratio rules out conventional 
approaches to addressing the bias created by either aggregation of 
assets or the omission of assets from book value. For instance, in many 
contexts where a dependent variable is measured with error, simply 
adding as a regressor a control variable that proxies for the 
mismeasurement error can diminish any possible bias. However, this 
approach is not possible when the outcome variable is a ratio with a 
mismeasured denominator. The intuition can be seen by comparing the 
following two equations: 
 𝑦∗ + 𝜇    = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖       (A) 
∗    =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖      (B) 
If 𝜇  represents measurement error, “controlling” for it in a 
regression framework effectively means moving it from the left-hand 
side of the equation to the right-hand side. In equation (A), we can do 
so by subtracting 𝜇  from both sides of the equation (in a regression 
setting, this is accomplished by adding a control variable to proxy for 
it), leaving the other variables (𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖 ) unaffected. In contrast, 
equation (B) requires us to multiply both sides of the equation by 
 𝜃 + 𝜇𝜃  
 
This would transform all right-side variables by the same ratio, 
creating a host of econometric problems in the process. In related work, 
we explore this empirical challenge in more detail and provide a method 
to address the problem of measurement error in the denominator of a 
 
 178. We calculate Microsoft’s Simple q using Compustat data for Microsoft’s 2010 fiscal year; 
we obtain Microsoft’s 2010 Total q from the Peters and Taylor dataset available at WHARTON RES. 
DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
FNA9-APVT]. 
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ratio such as Simple q.179 The bottom line is that simply adding a control 
for 𝜇  will not control for the bias arising from mismeasurement of the 
denominator in equation (B). Remarkably, this basic arithmetical 
problem with addressing measurement error in Simple q has gone 
unnoticed in both the finance and legal literatures.  
In short, scholars who rely on Simple q face a serious problem of 
measurement error bias. They cannot find solace in the argument that 
although any measurement error in the outcome variable (e.g., Simple 
q) might create large standard errors when estimating treatment 
effects, it does not otherwise create biased estimates of these treatment 
effects. As noted, that argument assumes the measurement error in 
Simple q conforms to the classical errors-in-variable model—an 
assumption that is inappropriate when measurement error is 
nonrandom and when it affects a ratio that is an outcome variable.  
C. Q and Equity Returns 
We conclude this Part by pointing out an interesting puzzle: 
firms with high Simple q have lower future equity returns, and vice 
versa. This empirical relationship is robust, as we demonstrate below. 
We hope researchers who draw conclusions about corporate law and 
corporate governance based on Tobin’s q will take notice of this point 
and engage with the puzzle. We expect that scholars will interpret our 
results in a variety of ways; we do not want to dictate their response. 
Our goal here is simply to set forth the empirical relationship between 
q and returns and provide some potential interpretations; it is not to 
resolve the puzzle definitively. 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we used historical stock price 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”) to 
construct two equally weighted stock portfolios for each January from 
1980 through 2009, and we evaluated these portfolios for the following 
twelve months. In the first portfolio, we selected the stocks of all firms 
with a fiscal year ending on December 31 whose Simple q fell within the 
lowest quartile of Simple q for these firms as of December 31 for the 
prior year. In the second, we constructed an identical portfolio except 
that we selected the stocks of all firms whose Simple q fell within the 
highest quartile of Simple q as of December 31 for the prior year.180 (For 
instance, when forming the January 1, 1989 portfolio, we selected 
stocks based on their Simple q for December 31, 1988.) We then 
 
 179. See Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25. 
 180. On average, each annual portfolio had approximately nine hundred securities assigned 
to it.  
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compared how these two annual portfolios fared over the ensuing 
twelve months relative to an investor who simply invested in an 
S&P 500 index fund on January 1. Figure 1 presents the average 
cumulative monthly return differentials between each portfolio and the 
S&P 500.   
 
FIGURE 1: CUMULATIVE MONTHLY PORTFOLIO RETURNS 




Clearly, an investor who formed these annual portfolios would 
have done significantly better by focusing on firms that fell within the 
lowest quartile of Simple q during the prior December. On average, the 
“low q” portfolio outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately seven 
percent by the end of each twelve-month period. In contrast, an investor 
who assumed that firms with high Simple q created stockholder value 
within a one-year time horizon would have been sorely disappointed. 
Indeed, this investor would have consistently underperformed an 
investment in the S&P 500.  
In Appendix B, we present a more formal analysis utilizing risk-
adjusted returns and controlling for year- and firm-fixed effects; the 
results are consistent with Figure 1.181 In unreported results, we also 
find that the inverse relationship between Tobin’s q and returns 
persists whether we define Tobin’s q using Simple q or Total q.  
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If these questions, and the above findings, sound familiar to 
scholars in law and finance, it is because they are: the finance literature 
has demonstrated a robust relationship between a risk factor that 
resembles Simple q and future equity returns. Indeed, our results above 
are consistent with a widely cited literature in asset pricing, originating 
with the pioneering work of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French.182 To 
our knowledge, the connection between this literature and Simple q has 
not previously been made by researchers who use Simple q as a proxy 
for firm value. 
In a series of papers, Fama and French showed that by adding 
several “risk factors” to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, they could 
explain expected returns of U.S. common stocks better than that widely 
used model. Most notably for our purposes, they examined the excess 
returns of “value” stocks, which they identified as those with a high 
book-to-market ratio.183 The Fama and French “HML” (high minus low) 
risk factor resembles the reciprocal of Simple q, except that it uses only 
the market and book value of equity, not the full capital structure. In 
other words, Tobin’s q and HML capture similar phenomena. 
More recently within asset pricing, a robust debate has emerged 
regarding the reason for this empirical relationship. As is often the case 
in asset pricing, the debate generally hinges on the extent to which one 
believes markets are subject to behavioral biases.  Fama and French, 
for instance, initially theorized that if markets are efficient in pricing 
stocks, the higher expected returns for “value” stocks indicate that 
investors must demand more compensation for investing in these  
securities because these securities are more risky (i.e., investors expect 
that returns from investing in value stocks will have high volatility).184     
Other scholars, however, have theorized that whether a firm is a “value” 
stock may reflect market inefficiencies that can affect managers’ 
investment decisions, which might explain the link between future 
returns and HML (and Simple q). For instance, in an influential paper, 
Christopher Polk and Paola Sapienza suggest that a firm’s stock price 
might be overvalued due to mispricing by equity markets, which 
encourages managers to overinvest.185 Empirically, they advance this 
 
 182. See, e.g., Fama & French, supra note 22. 
 183. See id. at 35–40 (finding that stock portfolios formed on the basis of firms’ book-to-market 
ratios are systematically related to returns in excess of those predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model). 
 184. See Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. 
FIN. 427, 428 (1992) (speculating that “[f]irms that the market judges to have poor prospects, 
signaled here by low stock prices and high ratios of book-to-market equity, have higher expected 
stock returns (they are penalized with higher costs of capital) than firms with strong prospects”). 
 185. Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test 
of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187 (2009). 
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argument by constructing a mispricing metric and find that it is 
positively related to investment.186 They also find an inverse relation 
between capital investment and future equity returns.187 In 
combination, they argue that this evidence suggests that overpriced 
firms tend to overinvest and underpriced firms tend to underinvest,188 
which could also account for the inverse association between q and 
equity returns shown in Figure 1.  
More recently, Lu Zhang has advanced an alternative 
explanation that endogenizes a firm’s investment and its returns.189 
According to this “Investment CAPM” theory, the findings documented 
by Polk and Sapienza (among others) are entirely consistent with 
Tobin’s original theory, and the relatively low expected returns for high-
q, high-investment firms are what one would expect to see if managers 
are in fact optimizing as postulated by Tobin. To understand why, 
consider two firms, A and B, that each expect a $1 investment in capital 
(net of adjustment costs) to produce $1.20 of future cash flows. If we 
observe that only firm A makes the $1 investment, the Investment 
CAPM posits that the discount rate for firm A (and therefore, its 
expected returns) must be lower than the discount rate for firm B.190 
Moreover, if markets are efficient, this will also mean that firm A will 
have a higher marginal q than firm B.191 In this fashion, firm A’s higher 
investment levels, higher q, and lower expected returns are all 
endogenously determined.  
To be sure, the Investment CAPM also predicts that high-
investment firms could also be firms that have a high marginal product 
of capital because they are simply more efficient. For instance, we would 
also observe that firm A invests $1 when firm B does not invest if firm 
A and firm B have the same discount rate (i.e., they have the same cost 
of capital), but firm A expects to generate greater future cash flows from 
an investment of $1 than firm B does. Note, however, that the 
Investment CAPM is agnostic as to whether firm A’s greater investment 
 
 186. Id. at 190–200. 
 187. Id. at 204–09.  
 188.  Id. at 212–13. 
 189. Lu Zhang, The Investment CAPM, 23 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 545, 593 (2017) (“In general 
equilibrium, risks, expected returns and characteristics are all endogenously determined 
simultaneously.”). 
 190. For example, the present value of $1.20 received in one year at a discount rate of 20% is 
$1.00 (i.e., 1.20 / 1.20); however, using a discount rate of 15% would produce a present value of 
approximately $1.04 (i.e., 1.20 / 1.15).   
 191. Marginal q is simply the ratio of the present value of the marginal benefits of investment 
to the marginal cost of investment (net of adjustment costs). Thus, if the present value of the 
marginal benefit of a $1 investment by firm A was $1.04 and only $1.00 for firm B, the marginal q 
for firm A would be 1.04, while the marginal q of firm B would be 1.00. 
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is a function of its marginal productivity of capital or its cost of capital. 
Nor does Investment CAPM place any interpretation on what it means 
for a firm to have either a low or high cost of capital; in contrast to the 
Fama and French model, it does not assume that a firm’s cost of capital 
must reflect risk.192 
Yuhang Xing further explores empirically the possibility that a 
firm’s high q can reflect either a high marginal productivity of capital 
or a low cost of capital.193 Xing finds that portfolios of firms with low 
investment growth have significantly higher average returns than 
portfolios of firms with high investment growth, even after controlling 
for the marginal productivity of capital. As Xing summarizes, these 
findings indicate that “higher Q and investment are more likely to 
result from lower expected returns in the future, rather than from a 
high marginal product of capital.”194 Xing further notes that the 
evidence suggests that firm-level capital investment is more likely to be 
driven by variation in future discount rates than by variation in the 
future productivity of its capital. 
We are not advocating any particular view: the debate about the 
relationship between q, investment, and expected returns is ongoing in 
the asset pricing literature, and we will follow it with interest. Our main 
contribution here is to show researchers this link between empirical 
corporate finance and asset pricing and to highlight the challenge that 
this literature poses for scholars who use q as a proxy for firm value. 
Put simply, researchers in empirical corporate finance have been using 
a proxy for firm value that researchers in asset pricing have been using, 
in similar form, for different purposes and with different 
interpretations. For some of these researchers, increases in q reflect 
market mispricing, which is followed by low returns to equity as the 
mispricing dissipates and management overinvests. For others, 
increases in q reflect a decrease in the expected volatility of a company’s 
stock returns. And for still others, increases in q may very well reflect 
stochastic reductions in a firm’s discount rate, not enhanced 
profitability. Under all of these theories, stockholders of high-q firms 
can be expected to earn low future returns. 
It is a puzzle for scholars who sanguinely conclude that a 
corporate law change is normatively desirable because it is associated 
 
 192. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 189, at 593 (“I interpret the q-factor model as a parsimonious 
description of the cross section of expected returns, not necessarily a risk factor model, and the q-
factor loadings as regression slopes, not necessarily measures of some inexplicable sources of 
risk.”). 
 193. Yuhang Xing, Interpreting the Value Effect Through the Q-Theory: An Empirical 
Investigation, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1767 (2008). 
 194. Id. at 1783. 
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with a higher measure of Simple q. At minimum, they should engage 
with the asset pricing literature’s findings that the book-to-market ratio 
is associated with relatively lower returns. We look forward to seeing 
how these scholars attempt to resolve this puzzle. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH  
In the preceding pages we have sought to convince readers that 
the common use of Simple q as a proxy for firm value is fundamentally 
flawed as a matter of intellectual history, as a matter of logic, and as a 
matter of empirics. Here, we conclude by taking stock of the widespread 
reliance on this flawed proxy for firm value with respect to both the 
state of corporate governance research and, more generally, the current 
“replication crisis” in social science.  
First and most obviously, the growing use and reliance on 
Simple q as a proxy for firm value raises troubling questions about the 
large body of empirical scholarship that examines how corporate 
governance affects firm value. Indeed, in Appendix C, we conduct a 
replication study to examine empirically how the flaws in Simple q can 
produce inaccurate empirical findings that have subsequently been 
used to draw conclusions about what constitutes “good” versus “bad” 
corporate governance. Our findings confirm that the flaws we document 
in Simple q can, in fact, lead to inaccurate empirical conclusions. 
In our replication study, we focus on reexamining the results of 
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell’s seminal paper, What 
Matters in Corporate Governance?195 Published in 2008 in the Review of 
Financial Studies, the article has been cited over 915 times according 
to Web of Science196 and has been downloaded over thirty thousand 
times on the Social Science Research Network.197 In their paper, 
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (“BCF”) hypothesize that 
governance provisions that “entrench[ ]” management can have 
negative implications for firm value.198 To test this hypothesis, BCF 
construct an Entrenchment Index—or E-Index—based on four 
provisions that materially constrain shareholder influence (staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority 
 
 195. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.  
 196. What Matters in Corporate Governance?, WEB SCI., http://apps.webofknowledge.com/ 
full_record.do?product=WOS&search_mode=AuthorFinder&qid=21&SID=5DRzNduOmAxJoKH
Mr3p&page=1&doc=3 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V8X7-TYZD].  
 197. What Matters in Corporate Governance, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4YJH-9WSZ]. 
 198. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 784. 
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requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments) and two that interfere with the market for corporate 
control (poison pills and golden parachutes).199 Consistent with their 
hypothesis, BCF find that increases in the level of the E-Index are 
monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in 
firm value as measured by Simple q.200 Moreover, BCF find that, upon 
controlling for the presence of entrenching governance provisions, other 
governance provisions that had previously been shown to affect Simple 
q no longer have any effect.201   
In Appendix C, we replicate BCF’s core findings using Simple q, 
finding (as did BCF) an inverse relationship between management 
entrenchment—as measured by the E-Index—and Simple q. Yet we also 
find that if we use the Peters and Taylor Total q as our proxy for firm 
value instead of Simple q, the results in BCF disappear: the reduction 
in statistical significance is dramatic.202  
As noted previously, Total q is an alternative estimate for “true” 
Tobin’s q and attempts to include in the denominator of Total q a firm’s 
level of intangible property. Peters and Taylor designed this estimate 
of Tobin’s q because intangibles are typically omitted from a firm’s book 
value of assets, which creates the likelihood that a firm’s Simple q will 
be biased upward if it makes large investments in intangibles. The 
availability of the Total q dataset therefore allows us to answer a 
critical question implicated by BCF’s decision to use Simple q as a proxy 
for firm value: if firms with low levels of the E-Index have high levels of 
intangibles, could this mean that the BCF finding was simply an 
artifact of bias in Simple q?   
As we show in Appendix C, our replication of the BCF study 
confirms that this is in fact the case for BCF’s central, causal finding. 
Firms having high levels of unbooked intangibles (as estimated in the 
Peters and Taylor dataset) have low levels of the E-Index. Moreover, 
simply substituting Total q for Simple q in the fixed-effects regression 
framework used by BCF shows that Total q has no statistically 
meaningful relationship with a firm’s level of the E-Index.   
By itself, our replication analysis has considerable implications 
for the current state of corporate governance research. For one, BCF’s 
empirical finding of a negative association between the E-Index and 
firm value has significantly informed how institutional investors decide 
what constitutes “good” and “bad” corporate governance in voting at 
 
 199. See id. at 784–85. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. at 821–23. 
 202. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (discussing the modified calculations of 
Peters and Taylor).   
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shareholder elections.203 For another, the governance index developed 
in the paper—the Entrenchment Index—is today a standard regressor 
in corporate governance research with over three hundred studies 
utilizing it.204 Yet, as with shareholders citing BCF when forming 
governance voting polices, the primary rationale for relying on the BCF 
paper stems from its empirical findings that the E-Index can affect firm 
value—a finding that turns out to be highly dependent on the particular 
proxy that they use for Tobin’s q.  
Additionally, BCF’s paper helped usher in a wave of studies 
adopting the same methodology to investigate the relationship between 
Simple q and various corporate governance characteristics. Today the 
BCF empirical framework of regressing Simple q on a governance 
provision of interest is the standard empirical framework for examining 
how any number of corporate characteristics can affect firm value. This 
is true both with respect to studies examining U.S. firms, as well as 
with respect to international studies designed to inform policy. Most 
notably, these studies have been especially influential in shaping how 
scholars and policymakers evaluate the relative merits of various 
corporate governance regimes, particularly within emerging markets. 
Many explicitly adopt the framework utilized by BCF insofar that they 
examine how various governance and firm characteristics predict levels 
of Simple q.205 In light of our replication study of BCF, we can only 
 
 203. For instance, two of the largest public pension funds—CalSTERS and CalPERS—have 
expressly cited the study as the basis for multiple declassification proposals submitted to publicly 
traded companies. See, e.g., Titan International, Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form 
PX14A6G) (May 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1081019/ 
000092189515001407/px14a6g00322tii_05182015.htm [https://perma.cc/QW3J-VLDN] (“A 
staggered board has been found to be one of six entrenching mechanisms that are negatively 
correlated with company performance, see “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” Lucian 
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 491 (09/2004, 
revised 04/2009)”); Letter from Charles E. Baker, Vice President & General Counsel, Ball Corp., 
to Office of Chief Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Ex. A (Dec. 21, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2010/calpers012510-14a8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SQE-8Q64] (shareholder proposal submitted by CalPERS citing the same). 
Companies have likewise cited the study in their own proposals for board declassification. See, e.g., 
Rofin-Sinar Technologies, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, at 16 (Schedule 14A) (Feb. 23, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1019361/000156761916001859/s001156x10_defn14a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EW7Z-JXMX] (citing BCF as support for an advisory vote to declassify the 
company’s board of directors). 
 204. See Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell Applied by More Than 300 
Research Papers, HARV. L. TODAY, (June 11, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/more-than-300-
research-papers-have-applied-the-entrenchment-index-of-bebchuk-cohen-and-ferrell/ 
[https://perma.cc/7CUW-QWTR] (remarking on the paper’s circulation and influence). 
 205. See, e.g., Marcus V. Braga-Alves & Kuldeep Shastri, Corporate Governance, Valuation, 
and Performance: Evidence from a Voluntary Market Reform in Brazil, 40 FIN. MGMT. 139 (2011) 
(analyzing whether corporate governance efforts were significantly related to firm value and 
operating performance using Simple q); Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Does Corporate Governance 
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suspect that the many studies that follow BCF in using Simple q as a 
proxy for firm value likewise suffer from the bias arising from using 
Simple q as an outcome variable. 
Finally, our critique of BCF, combined with the history of Tobin’s 
q described in Part II, contributes to the “replication crisis” debate in 
social science generally. Over the past several years, researchers across 
a range of disciplines have been unable to replicate a number of notable 
empirical findings due to both intentional data falsification as well as 
selective reporting of data and statistical tests.206 The crisis has been 
especially prominent in the field of psychology where data from a large 
ongoing replication project has revealed a surprisingly high percentage 
of prior studies that cannot be replicated.207 Related efforts have sought 
to ensure the replicability of future findings by, among other things, 
requiring the preregistration of research hypotheses and modifying the 
procedures for determining statistical significance.208  
We add two important new elements to the broader academic 
debate about replication. First, we demonstrate the importance of close 
historical analysis, beyond a simple literature review, particularly to 
ensure that scholars understand how the constructs they are examining 
have changed over time. By the 1990s, the original story of Tobin’s q 
played little role in scholars’ decisions to adopt Simple q as a proxy for 
 
Predict Future Performance? Evidence from Hong Kong, 40 FIN. MGMT. 159 (2011) (examining the 
relation between changes in the quality of corporate governance practices and subsequent market 
valuation among large listed companies in Hong Kong using Simple q); Beverley Jackling & 
Shireenjit Johl, Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from India’s Top Companies, 17 
CORP. GOVERNANCE 492 (2009) (analyzing the relationship between internal governance 
structures and financial performance using Simple q); Jonchi Shyu, Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese Firms, 7 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 397 (2011) (using 
Simple q as a valuation indicator to analyze the effect of family ownership on firm performance); 
Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Ultimate Government Control Structure and Fair Value: Evidence from 
Chinese Listed Companies, 2 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 13 (2009) (examining the impact of government 
control structures on firm value of Chinese companies using Simple q); Lijun Xia, Founder Control, 
Ownership Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Listed Firms in China, 1 
CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 31 (2009) (investigating the effect of the deviation between the controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights on firm value using Simple q). 
 206. For a summary, see Rotello et al., supra note 24. 
 207. See id. (discussing the problems of replication and misinterpretation plaguing 
psychological studies); see also Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 
supra note 24 (describing a large-scale replication project within psychology).  
 208. See Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology: 
Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant, 
22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359 (2011) (providing four guidelines for researchers in psychology to reduce 
the risk of false-positive findings); Joseph E. Gonzales & Corbin A. Cunningham, The Promise of 
Pre-Registration in Psychological Research, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2015/08/pre-registration [https://perma.cc/647S-YJXM] 
(describing journals where researchers either have the option or are required to submit their 
research rationale, hypotheses, design and analytic strategy to the journal for peer review before 
beginning the study).  
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Tobin’s q. Scholars who do not focus on the historical origin of the 
constructs they are testing risk repeating the kinds of errors associated 
with Simple q. We caution academics to be especially wary of constructs 
that have acquired technical labels, including the names of prominent 
scholars, but whose meaning has strayed from the original concept. 
Second, we show that it is important not only to replicate past 
studies, but to validate them. Our replication of BCF’s study highlights 
how the inability to replicate a study is just one way in which empirical 
analysis can fail. We were able to replicate BCF’s findings. However, 
we also showed that the statistical significance of BCF’s replicated 
findings disappears when we use an alternative dependent variable 
that arguably corrects some (but not all) of the flaws in BCF’s 
dependent variable. In other words, the replication problem we have 
identified in corporate governance scholarship goes beyond the 
reliability problem that has been demonstrated in the social sciences: 
we raise questions about the validity of studies that use Simple q. 
Validity and reliability are core principles of the scientific 
method, and both are required in evaluating the accuracy of an 
empirical test.209 In general, the validity of a scientific test is the extent 
to which “it measures what it purports to measure.”210 Reliability, on 
the other hand, is a term used to describe the consistency or stability of 
test results. As an illustration of these concepts, consider a scale that 
consistently mismeasures the weight of an individual by subtracting 
ten pounds from the individual’s true weight. Such a scale would be 
reliable insofar that repeated attempts to weigh the same group of 
individuals would result in similar findings. But the scale itself would 
lack validity as a measure for these individuals’ true weight.  
Moreover, knowledge of the scale’s history could be crucial. 
Suppose the scale became progressively less accurate each year (just as 
a financial variable that omitted intangible assets might become 
progressively less accurate over time, as intangible assets increase). A 
person who observes a declining value on the scale over the course of a 
decade might incorrectly assume they have lost weight, just as a scholar 
might make incorrect assumptions about changes in Simple q. 
Identifying the story of Tobin’s q as an issue of validity rather 
than reliability helps explain the persistent use of Simple q while 
highlighting how current efforts to address the “replication crisis” are 
 
 209. Indeed, these concepts are central to evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. See 
David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations Following Daubert, 
Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199 (2003) (explaining the principles of validity and 
reliability, particularly as applied to the forensic use of psychological evaluation, and discussing 
recent precedent expounding these precepts). 
 210. MARY J. ALLEN & WENDY M. YEN, INTRODUCTION TO MEASUREMENT THEORY 113 (2001). 
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largely ill-equipped to address empirical problems arising from the use 
of invalid measures.211 Most notably, efforts designed to ensure greater 
empirical reliability—e.g., publicly sharing datasets, preregistering 
hypotheses, adjusting significance tests—do little to dislodge the use of 
invalid measures, such as Simple q. On the contrary, as more and more 
researchers adopt an invalid measure either to replicate results or 
reinterpret prior results, the very emphasis on reliability can have the 
pernicious effect of entrenching the use of the measure. Indeed, within 
psychology, Caren Rotello, Evan Heit, and Chad Dubé note that the 
problem of using invalid measures may be more troubling than the 
problem of failing to replicate empirical findings based on those 
measures. As they note,  
This problem—of dramatically and consistently “getting it wrong”—is potentially a bigger 
problem for psychologists than the replication crisis, because the errors can easily go 
undetected for long periods of time. The probability of self-correction is low, even if ever 
larger numbers of researchers work on these same (and similar) problems . . . Nor is peer 
review likely to provide a solution: Once an effect is “established,” it may become 
challenging to persuade reviewers that the data should be analyzed differently.212 
As this paper shows, a similar conclusion can also be drawn about the 
use of Simple q. 
In the absence of clear statistical solutions to the problem of 
invalid measures, Rotello, Heit, and Dubé conclude that addressing the 
problem ultimately requires “scientific discipline.”213 As they elaborate, 
“It requires careful attention to the details of [dependent variables], 
thorough awareness of their assumptions, and deliberate testing of 
their validity.”214 Drawing on both intellectual history and empirical 
methods, the approach we have taken aims to provide precisely this 
type of analysis of Simple q, revealing it to underperform on all fronts. 
At the same time, we hope our critique will encourage scholars to 
explore using more direct measures of firm value rather than an invalid 
measure such as Simple q.  
Of course, only time will tell whether our critique will be 
sufficient to alter the current state of corporate governance research. 
Meanwhile, we hope to instill among law and finance scholars a healthy 
skepticism about relying on the prevailing methodological orthodoxy. 
 
 211. See Rotello et al., supra note 24, at 944.  
 212. Id. at 950–51. 
 213. Id. at 951. 
 214. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many of the most important findings in corporate law 
scholarship are based on studies that rely on a modified version of a 
firm’s market-to-book ratio. Although these studies call this ratio 
“Tobin’s q,” the difference between it—what we call “Simple q”—and 
Tobin’s q as originally defined are significant. Because Simple q is a 
ratio based on a firm’s book value of assets, studies that use Simple q 
are likely to produce biased estimates due to both omitted assets (e.g., 
intangibles) and firm-specific details that can systematically alter 
Simple q (e.g., the level of current assets, depreciation, and so on). As a 
result, scholars should view with suspicion any assertions about 
corporate law or corporate characteristics that are based on Simple q. 
Given the importance of understanding how corporate law and 
governance can affect the value of a corporation’s securities, we hope to 
inspire a broader conversation about the challenge of measuring firm 
value. Until scholars find a more reliable way to assess the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value, they should stop relying 
on Simple q, or market-to-book, a measure that masquerades as Tobin’s 
q, but is not. 
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT ASSETS AND INTANGIBLES 
Table A.1 presents our test of the relationship between current 
assets and Simple q. We calculate Simple q for all nonfinancial 
Compustat firms between 1990 and 2010 as of the end of each firm’s 
fiscal year. 215 For each firm, we also determine the fraction of the firm’s 
total book value of assets that consists of current assets for that fiscal 
year. We present the results of two regressions in which we regress a 
firm’s Simple q on this ratio (% Current Assets) for the same year. We 
also include as a covariate the inverse of a firm’s book value to avoid 
the risk of spurious correlation on account of the presence of book value 
in both the denominator of Simple q and % Current Assets.216 In Column 
1, we conduct the regression controlling for industry- and year-fixed 
effects (with robust standard errors clustered by firm); in Column 2, we 
control for firm- and year-fixed effects.217 
 
TABLE A.1: CURRENT ASSETS AND SIMPLE Q 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
% Current Assets     2.617***     2.748*** 
 [0.393] [0.236] 
   
1 / (Book Value)     0.508***     0.278*** 
 [0.181] [0.016] 
   
Industry FE Y N 
Firm FE N Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 106,856 106,856 
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
As shown in both columns, a firm’s level of current assets is 
positively associated with a firm’s Simple q even after controlling for 
industry- and firm-fixed effects. Overall, these regression estimates are 
consistent with the market attributing a higher q-ratio to current 
assets.   
Table A.2 illustrates the association between a firm’s intangible 
assets and Simple q. As in Table A.1, we calculate Simple q for all 
 
 215. We exclude firms having a Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) code between 6,000 
and 7,000.  
 216. The necessity for including this covariate is discussed in Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 
25; and Kronmal, supra note 143, at 381–84.  
 217. We use 2-digit SIC codes to control for industry fixed effects.  
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nonfinancial Compustat firms between 1990 and 2010 as of the end of 
each firm’s fiscal year.218 For each firm i, we calculate the percentage of 
a company’s assets (% Intangiblesi,t) in fiscal year t that consists of 
intangible assets that are unrecorded in book value.219 As in Table A.1, 
we present the results of two regressions in which we regress a firm’s 
Simple q on this ratio (% Intangibles) for the same year, along with the 
inverse of a firm’s book value. In Column 1, we conduct the regression 
controlling for industry- and year-fixed effects (with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm); in Column 2, we control for firm- and year-
fixed effects.   
 
TABLE A.2: INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND SIMPLE Q 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
% Intangibles     3.982***   4.430** 
 [0.673] [2.185] 
   
1 / (Book Value)     0.506***    0.277*** 
 [0.182] [0.020] 
   
Industry FE Y N 
Firm FE N Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 133,745 133,745 
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Column 1 shows that firms with large unbooked intangible 
assets have larger estimates of Simple q. Column 2 confirms this result 
even after controlling for firm-fixed effects.  
  
 
 218. As above, we exclude firms having an SIC code between 6,000 and 7,000; we similarly use 
two-digit SIC codes when controlling for industry-fixed effects.  
 219. Estimates of unbooked intangibles for individual firms are obtained from the Total q 
dataset created by Peters and Taylor. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 258 tbl.1 (providing 
summary statistics). The dataset is available through WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., supra note 
178.  
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APPENDIX B: SIMPLE Q AND CUMULATIVE ANNUAL RETURNS 
In Table B.1, we present several empirical analyses of the 
relationship between shareholder returns and Simple q. In all analyses 
we use the monthly stock file at CRSP to estimate the cumulative one-
year return for every security in CRSP between 1980 and 2010 as a 
function of the security’s Simple q as of the beginning of each calendar 
year. As in Appendix A, we exclude firms having Standard Industrial 
Classification (“SIC”) codes between 6,000 and 7,000. In Columns 1 and 
2, we estimate this relationship using a security’s gross cumulative 
annual return over year t. Our outcome variable of interest is the one-
year buy-and-hold return from investing in each security i at the 
beginning of year t, as a function of the firm’s Simple q as of the 
beginning of year t. We then conduct two regressions. In the first 
(Column 1), we regress this return on the natural log of the security’s 
measure for Simple q as of the beginning of year t. In the second 
(Column 2), we regress this annual return on whether the security’s 
Simple q fell within the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of all 
estimates of Simple q as of the beginning of year t. In both cases, we 
also control for year- and firm-fixed effects.   
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, a security’s Simple q is inversely 
related to the security’s subsequent returns in both models. In Columns 
3 and 4, we conduct the same analysis but rather than using a security’s 
gross annual return, we use as our dependent variable the security’s 
risk-adjusted cumulative annual return for the same time period. We 
calculate this last measure using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model, in which we estimate factor coefficients for each security i for 
year t using the security’s monthly return data for the twenty-four-
month period prior to and including December of year t-1. Using 
monthly returns for year t, we calculate monthly risk-adjusted returns 
as a security’s actual return less the return predicted from the four-
factor model, which we use to construct the cumulative risk-adjusted 
return over year t. Regardless of whether we examine gross returns or 
risk-adjusted returns, Simple q remains inversely associated with a 




 220. The results of Table B.1 remain unchanged if we estimate these regressions using the 
Fama-MacBeth procedure rather than firm- and time-fixed effects. See Eugene F. Fama and James 
D. MacBeth, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973) (using 
the two-parameter portfolio model to evaluate the connection between average return and risk of 
NYSE common stocks). 
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TABLE B.1: RETURNS AND SIMPLE Q 
 














     
Ln(q)  -0.323***  -0.633***  
 [.0432]  [.0551]  
Second Quartile of q    -0.172***    -0.246*** 
  [0.0286]  [0.0167] 
Third Quartile of q    -0.290***   - 0.480*** 
  [0.0413]  [0.0269] 
Fourth Quartile of q    -0.458***    -0.898*** 
  [0.0679]  [0.0502] 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
N 177,191 177,191 177,191 177,191 
Robust standard errors (clustered by year) in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX C: BCF REPLICATION STUDY 
We present in this Appendix our replication study of What 
Matters in Corporate Governance?, a widely cited paper by Lucian 
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (“BCF”),221 which was 
published in 2009 in the Review of Financial Studies. In addition to 
being highly influential within both the academy and industry, this 
paper was an ideal choice for two primary reasons. First, because BCF 
publicly provide much of their core dataset on Lucian Bebchuk’s 
website, it is possible for us to replicate their study. Unfortunately, a 
large number of papers in empirical finance use hand-collected datasets 
that are not available to other researchers. Second, because BCF use 
Simple q as a proxy for Tobin’s q, it is straightforward to compare their 
results with results that arise when one uses a different proxy for 
Tobin’s q. Most notably, we focus on the measure of Total q developed 
by Peters and Taylor and discussed in the main text. As noted 
previously, this alternative measure of q attempts to address 
specifically the measurement error in Simple q arising from the 
omission of intangibles in book value. Accordingly, we can use Total q 
to examine how this well-known aspect of measurement error in Simple 
q might have biased prior findings. 
BCF built on a seminal study published in 2003 by Paul 
Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (“GIM”), entitled Corporate 
Governance and Equity Prices.222 In their study, GIM constructed a 
“Governance Index” based on twenty-four governance provisions 
tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC”) to 
proxy for the level of shareholder rights at 1,500 large firms during the 
1990s.223 GIM investigated returns from investing in “good 
governance,” an investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest 
decile of the index (strong shareholder rights) and sold firms in the 
highest decile of the index (weak shareholder rights).224 Remarkably, 
the study reported that this strategy would have earned abnormal 
returns of 8.5 percent per year from 1990 through 1999.225 
BCF hypothesized that only a subset of these provisions truly 
matter to investors, with those that “entrench” management being the 
most significant.226 Accordingly, they constructed an Entrenchment 
Index—or E-Index—based on four IRRC provisions that materially 
 
 221. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5. 
 222. See Gompers et al., supra note 5. 
 223. See id. at 114–19 (describing the Governance Index). 
 224. See id. at 144–45 (describing the study’s conclusions). 
 225. Id. at 144. 
 226. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 785.  
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constrain shareholder influence (staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments) and 
two that interfere with the market for corporate control (poison pills 
and golden parachutes).227  
BCF found that increases in the level of the E-Index were 
monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in 
firm value as measured by Simple q.228 Using the same framework as 
GIM, they also found that pursuing the same long-short investment 
strategy but focusing on buying firms with the lowest E-Index and 
shorting firms with the highest E-Index would have produced abnormal 
monthly returns of 116 basis points per month during the 1990s.229 In 
contrast, the other eighteen IRRC provisions not in the entrenchment 
index were uncorrelated with either Simple q or abnormal returns.230 
BCF’s finding that the results from GIM were driven primarily by the 
six entrenchment provisions made the paper highly influential in the 
corporate governance literature.231  
To the extent BCF sought to advance the more ambitious claim 
that high entrenchment actually results in lower firm value or 
abnormal returns, BCF were more cautious given the largely 
correlational nature of their analyses. The paper concluded by noting: 
“We present some evidence that is consistent with the possibility that, 
in the aggregate, the entrenching provisions bring about or help 
maintain lower firm valuation. But this evidence does not establish 
causality and much more work needs to be done.”232 
The evidence that BCF found with respect to a possible causal 
relationship focused primarily on the fact that many of the firms within 
their sample altered their E-Index over time.233 Accordingly, by 
exploiting the panel structure of the data, they examined how variation 
in the E-Index was associated with changes in Simple q, which revealed 
a negative relationship.234 Describing this finding as “consistent” with 
a causal relationship, they tentatively noted: “[T]o the extent that the 
identified correlation between the provisions in our E index and firm 
 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. at 815. 
 230. See id. at 816 tbl.10 (showcasing the monthly abnormal returns for the different E-Index 
portfolios).  
 231. See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.  
 232. Id. at 823. 
 233. See id. at 803 (“[T]here was meaningful variation in the incidence of some entrenching 
provisions over the 1990–2003 period, such as golden parachutes and limits on shareholders’ 
ability to amend bylaws, that would result in changes in firms’ entrenchment scores.”). 
 234. See id. 
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value at least partly reflects a causal relation going from entrenchment 
to firm value, these provisions are ones that deserve the attention of 
private and public decision makers seeking to improve corporate 
governance.”235 Despite this qualified approach, the paper’s widely cited 
findings nevertheless helped usher in a wave of studies examining the 
relationship between q and various corporate governance 
characteristics.  
We begin our analysis by first investigating the extent to which 
the E-Index is correlated with measurement error in Simple q, or qs. 
Because we are interested in examining the consequences of 
measurement error in Tobin’s q, we make the strong (and unrealistic) 
assumption that Total q (qTotal) represents the “true” value of q. To the 
extent this were actually the case, Simple q would therefore contain 
multiplicative measurement error, 𝜑 , as follows:236 
 𝑞    =    𝑞 𝜑    
 
We test empirically whether this measurement error in Simple q 
is correlated with the E-Index. All analyses are conducted on the same 
sample of firms used by BCF, which we obtain from Lucian Bebchuk’s 
website.237 For each firm, the file lists by year its corresponding E-Index 
value, and we calculate 𝜑  for each observation as 𝑞 /𝑞 . In Column 
1 of Table C.1, we present coefficient estimates of a simple regression of 
the natural log of 𝜑  on E-indexit, including industry- and year-fixed 
effects.   
 
 
 235. Id. at 785, 787. 
 236. As noted in Part II, both the numerator of Simple q (denoted here as 𝑀𝑉∗) and its 
denominator (denoted here as 𝐵𝑉∗) mismeasure the true numerator and denominator of Tobin’s q. 
See supra notes 146–162 (discussing evidence of measurement error in q calculations). If these 
true values are denoted MV and RV, respectively, we can express the relationship between “true” 
q and Simple q as follows: 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑞  =   𝑀𝑉∗𝐵𝑉∗ 𝑥 (𝐵𝑉∗)(𝑀𝑉)(𝑀𝑉∗)(𝑅𝑉)   
Thus, measurement error in Simple q is multiplicative, as reflected by the need to multiply Simple 
q by ( ∗)( )( ∗)( ) to transform Simple q into True q.  We represent ( ∗)( )( ∗)( ) by the variable 𝜑 . 
 237. The dataset can be downloaded at the following link. Data, HARV. L., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml (last updated Feb. 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/5GLR-V73P]. 
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TABLE C.1: MEASUREMENT ERROR AND THE E-INDEX 
 
 (1) (s) 
DV Ln(𝜑 ) Intangiblesit 
E-Index   -0.063***   -129.268*** 
 (0.015)   (49.083) 
Book Value       0.019** 
      (0.008) 
Constant   -0.587***     273.304*** 
 (0.034) (96.433) 
Year-Fixed Effects Y Y 
Industry-Fixed Effects Y Y 
N 14,658 17,823 
R-squared 0.265    0.169 
Robust standard errors (clustered by industry) in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Column 1 of Table C.1 presents the coefficient estimate. As 
shown in the table, the coefficient of -0.063 has a standard error of 
0.015, indicating a negative association between 𝜑  and the E-Index. In 
Column 2, we examine whether the E-Index is associated with different 
levels of unbooked intangibles. For each firm i, we obtain Intangiblesi,t, 
defined as the level of unbooked intangibles reported in the Peters and 
Taylor dataset at Wharton Research Data Services (“WRDS”), for each 
firm year and similarly regress it on E-Indexit, including industry- and 
year-fixed effects as well as a control for a firm’s book value in year t. 
The coefficient of -141.658 is statistically significant. These latter 
results suggest that the negative correlation of 𝜑  and the E-Index is 
driven in part by the fact that firms having lower E-Index scores have 
a greater percentage of their assets in the form of unbooked intangibles. 
Next, we replicate BCF’s core finding regarding entrenchment 
and Tobin’s q, which they estimate by using Simple q. As reflected in 
Table C.1, all analyses are conducted on the same sample of firms used 
by BCF. We present the results of this replication in the first two 
columns of Table C.2. 
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TABLE C.2: 
REPLICATION OF BCF USING SIMPLE Q AND TOTAL Q— 
POOLED REGRESSIONS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
E-Index -0.118***  -0.225***  
 [0.00814]  [0.0258]  
E-Index 1  -0.278***  -0.362** 
  [0.0520]  [0.158] 
E-Index 2  -0.350***  -0.597*** 
  [0.0488]  [0.148] 
E-Index 3  -0.452***  -0.714*** 
  [0.0485]  [0.146] 
E-Index 4  -0.555***  -1.110*** 
  [0.0486]  [0.148] 
E-Index 5-6  -0.687***  -1.014*** 
  [0.0556]  [0.198] 
O-Index 0.00908* 0.00949* 0.00996 0.0103 
 [0.00508] [0.00510] [0.0153] [0.0154] 
Log[Assets] -0.0261*** -0.0286*** 0.346*** 0.344*** 
 [0.00869] [0.00878] [0.0327] [0.0326] 
Log[Age] -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.777*** -0.773*** 
 [0.0156] [0.0156] [0.0523] [0.0523] 
Delaware 
Incorporation 0.00599 0.00694 -0.205*** -0.210*** 
 [0.0214] [0.0214] [0.0679] [0.0680] 
Insider 
Ownership 0.438 0.377 5.965*** 5.855*** 
[0.337] [0.338] [1.024] [1.028] 
Insider 
Ownership 
Squared -1.125 -1.03 -9.770*** -9.603*** 
 [0.731] [0.734] [1.869] [1.874] 
ROA 1.686*** 1.687*** 2.832*** 2.831*** 
 [0.220] [0.219] [0.328] [0.326] 
CAPX/Assets 1.637*** 1.653*** -8.941*** -8.946*** 
 [0.203] [0.203] [0.633] [0.634] 
Leverage -0.712*** -0.719*** -1.475*** -1.483*** 
 [0.0935] [0.0936] [0.271] [0.272] 
R&D per Sales 0.0208*** 0.0209*** 0.0291*** 0.0291*** 
 [0.00632] [0.00637] [0.00688] [0.00697] 
Year-Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm-Fixed 
Effects  N N N N 
Number of 
Observations 11,336 11,336 11,336 11,336 
R-squared 0.138 0.139 0.098 0.098 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
 
As in the BCF study, Column 1 presents the results of a pooled 
OLS regression for their sample firms for the 1992–2002 period. 
Following their original specification, we regress the industry-adjusted 
Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:12 PM 
2020] THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q 421 
Simple q for firm i in year t on the firm’s E-index score for that year, 
holding constant a variety of variables. Consistent with BCF, we define 
a firm’s industry-adjusted Simple q as a firm’s Simple q minus the 
median Simple q in the firm’s industry in the observation year (using 
two-digit SIC codes). Due to the existence of outliers, we winsorize this 
measure at one percent. We note that this differs slightly from the 
approach of BCF, who use as their dependent variable the log of a firm’s 
industry-adjusted Simple q. We use winsorized, nontransformed 
industry-adjusted Simple q for two reasons. First, industry-adjusted 
Simple q can yield negative values, and BCF do not describe how they 
conducted their log transformation given the presence of these negative 
measures. Second, BCF report obtaining the same results using 
nontransformed industry-adjusted Simple q. 
In all regressions in Table C.2, including the regression in 
Column 1, we include the same controls used in BCF, which include the 
assets of the firm (in logs), the age of the firm (in logs), whether the firm 
is incorporated in Delaware (0/1), the level of insider ownership (and its 
squared value), return on assets, capital expenditures (scaled by total 
assets), research and development (“R&D”) expenditures (scaled by 
sales), and leverage. In keeping with BCF’s approach, we also include 
as a control a firm’s “O Index,” which they define as a firm’s IRRC 
provisions (reported by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick)238 minus its E-
Index value. BCF include this latter variable to estimate how well the 
E-Index predicts firm outcomes relative to the other governance 
provisions tracked by IRRC. Finally, we include year-fixed effects and 
a dummy variable for missing R&D expenditures, also consistent with 
BCF.239 As with BCF, we use robust standard errors to account for 
potential heteroskedasticity. 
In Column 1, the coefficient on the E-Index is significantly 
negative, consistent with the findings of BCF. In Column 2, we further 
confirm the findings of BCF when we regress industry-adjusted Simple 
q on dummy variables that represent the different levels that the E-
Index can take. As noted by BCF, this latter specification avoids the 
imposition of linearity on the E-Index’s relationship with industry-
adjusted Simple q. The results in Column 2 track those of BCF closely, 
with each level of the E-Index having an increasingly negative 
association with industry-adjusted Simple q. Moreover, across all six 
levels of the index, the results are significant at the one percent level. 
 
 238. See Gompers et al., supra note 5. 
 239. BCF appear to use a dummy for missing variables for R&D given the large number of 
observations for which R&D expenditures are missing. BCF do not specify how they implement 
this dummy variable substitution; therefore, we do so by substituting the median value of observed 
R&D values for missing R&D values and dummy code these observations as “missing R&D.” 
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Similar to BCF, the coefficient on the O-Index is positive and significant 
in both columns, though only at the ten percent level. 
In the third and fourth columns, we re-run each of these 
specifications using industry-adjusted Total q rather than industry-
adjusted Simple q. As with calculating industry-adjusted Simple q, we 
define a firm’s industry-adjusted Total q as a firm’s Total q (as reported 
in the Peters and Taylor dataset) minus the median Total q in the firm’s 
industry in the observation year (using two-digit SIC codes). As with 
industry-adjusted Simple q, we winsorize the measure at one percent. 
As shown in Columns 3 and 4, the results are strikingly similar to those 
obtained in Columns 1 and 2. The primary exception is that the 
negative coefficient on E-Index 5-6 is slightly less negative than the 
coefficient on E-Index 4. The positive coefficient on the O-Index is also 
no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Overall, Table C.2 suggests that BCF’s original finding that 
firms with high E-Index values are associated with lower Tobin’s q 
persists regardless of whether we define Tobin’s q using Simple q or 
Total q. However, as emphasized by BCF, these cross-sectional 
regressions do not speak to their more provocative suggestion that 
changes in a firm’s E-Index can cause changes in firm value. To get at 
this latter issue, BCF ran an additional set of specifications using firm-
fixed effects to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity that remains 
constant over their sample period.240 By holding constant firm-fixed 
effects, these regressions put them on a firmer footing for examining 
how changes in the E-Index over time at a firm might affect its industry-
adjusted Simple q. As they note, “The fixed effects 
regressions . . . examine the effect on firm value of changes that firms 
made, during the 1990–2003 period, in the number of entrenching 
provisions (whether to increase or decrease the number of entrenching 
provisions).”241  
In Table C.3, we use both BCF’s measure of industry-adjusted 
Simple q and industry-adjusted Total q as our outcome variables. The 
first two columns use industry-adjusted Simple q and replicate the 
results obtained by BCF. Specifically, in Column 1, the coefficient on 
the E-Index is negative and significant at the one percent level, and the 
coefficient on the O-Index is now insignificant. Overall, these results 
are virtually the same as those obtained by BCF.   
 
 240. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 803. 
 241. Id. 
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TABLE C.3: 
REPLICATION OF BCF USING SIMPLE Q AND TOTAL Q—
CONTROLLING FOR FIRM-FIXED EFFECTS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
E-Index -0.0450***  -0.0479  
 [0.0148]  [0.0454]  
E-Index 1  -0.0872*  -0.136 
  [0.0494]  [0.119] 
E-Index 2  -0.0846  -0.0569 
  [0.0537]  [0.132] 
E-Index 3  -0.164***  -0.109 
  [0.0589]  [0.151] 
E-Index 4  -0.211***  -0.256 
  [0.0647]  [0.183] 
E-Index 5-6  -0.203***  -0.255 
  [0.0724]  [0.356] 
O-Index 0.00604 0.00599 0.0388*** 0.0390*** 
 [0.00439] [0.00439] [0.0115] [0.0115] 
Log[Assets] -0.319*** -0.318*** 0.00333 0.005 
 [0.0327] [0.0327] [0.0998] [0.0997] 
Log[Age] -0.177** -0.178*** -1.300*** -1.309*** 
 [0.0694] [0.0692] [0.185] [0.186] 
Delaware 
Incorporation - - - - 
     
Insider 
Ownership 1.370*** 1.374*** 1.453 1.463 
[0.418] [0.420] [1.200] [1.208] 
Insider 
Ownership 
Squared -1.409** -1.412** -1.072 -1.076 
 [0.708] [0.708] [1.706] [1.714] 
ROA 1.118*** 1.117*** 2.278*** 2.275*** 
 [0.179] [0.179] [0.318] [0.318] 
CAPX / Assets 1.697*** 1.699*** 0.274 0.275 
 [0.270] [0.270] [0.536] [0.537] 
Leverage -0.407*** -0.409*** 0.061 0.0536 
 [0.138] [0.138] [0.295] [0.295] 
R&D per Sales 0.00622 0.00623 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 
 [0.00493] [0.00493] [0.00264] [0.00266] 
Year-Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm-Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,336 11,336 11,336 11,336 
R-squared 0.734 0.734 0.772 0.772 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
   
 
In Column 2, we further follow BCF in exploring whether higher 
values of the E-Index are more predictive of declining values of 
industry-adjusted Simple q, holding constant firm-fixed effects. 
Consistent with BCF, the coefficients grow increasingly negative 
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between E-Index 1 through E-Index 5-6, although only the last three 
levels of the E-Index achieve the same level of statistical significance as 
in the BCF paper. Overall, however, one could draw a similar conclusion 
as BCF in interpreting these findings as suggesting that higher levels 
of entrenchment cause a decline in industry-adjusted Simple q. 
Moreover, the absence of any significant coefficient on the O-Index 
suggests that the mechanism by which corporate governance might 
affect Simple q would be through the E-Index as opposed to the G-Index.  
In contrast, as shown in Columns 3 and 4, the same cannot be 
said of the relationship between the E-Index and industry-adjusted 
Total q. In both Columns 3 and 4, the coefficients on the E-Index have 
lost all statistical significance. More importantly, the coefficient on the 
O-Index is positive and significant at the one percent level. In other 
words, BCF’s main results do not hold if we simply substitute Total q 
for Simple q. 
These results underscore how failure to account for 
measurement error in a ratio that is used as an outcome variable can 
lead to biased regression estimates. Additionally, note that BCF 
included R&D as a control variable, but the addition of this variable 
was insufficient to control for the fact that Simple q omitted a firm’s 
investment in intangible assets.  
Of course, Total q is not necessarily an appropriate substitute 
for Tobin’s q generally, or even a defensible substitute for Simple q. 
Among other things, for instance, it continues to rely on the book values 
of PPE, which are recorded at cost and subject to depreciation. Total q 
also reflects the capitalization of R&D as well as a fixed thirty percent 
measure of selling, general, and administrative expenses, both of which 
are unlikely to be associated with actual replacement costs. The ratio of 
the denominator of Total q to replacement costs is unlikely to be 
straightforward. But our point is not to advocate on behalf of Total q; 
rather it is to illustrate that there are good reasons to believe 
measurement error in a ratio that is an outcome variable can easily bias 
results, even when a researcher includes proxies for this measurement 
error as a covariate. 
   
 
